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Property as a Natural Right and as a
Conventional Right in Constitutional Law
BRET BOYCE*
I. INTRODUCTION
The nature and scope of the right to property is one of the
most controversial issues of constitutional law, not only in the
United States, but throughout the world.! Modern U.S. "takings"
jurisprudence, which has been characterized by contradictory pro-
nouncements on the constitutional definition of property and a
proliferation of seemingly inconsistent categorical and balancing
tests, is widely regarded as incoherent. Internationally, as judicial
review has gained increasingly wider acceptance, the question of
whether the right to property ought to be regarded as a fundamen-
tal constitutional right has proved controversial.2
I Assistant Professor of Law, University of Detroit Mercy School of Law. B.A. Yale Uni-
versity, J.D. Northwestern University, Ph.D. Brown University. The author wishes to
thank Gregory Alexander, Michael Perry, and Laura Underkuffler for their thoughtful
comments and suggestions.
1. See, e.g., GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, THE GLOBAL DEBATE OVER
CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY: LESSONS FOR AMERICAN TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE 1-2
(2006); Andr6 van der Walt, The Constitutional Property Clause: Striking a Balance Be-
tween Guarantee and Limitation, in PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 109, 109 (Janet
McLean ed., 1999); Jennifer Nedelsky, Should Property be Constitutionalized? A Rela-
tional and Comparative Approach, in PROPERTY LAW ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST
CENTURY 417, 418-19 (G.E. van Maanen & A.J. van der Walt eds., 1996) [hereinafter
PROPERTY LAW].
2. For a systematic overview of the international treatment of constitutional prop-
erty clauses, see generally A.J. VAN DER WALT, CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY CLAUSES:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1999). The right to property has been embraced by many
emerging democracies in the developing and ex-communist world, and most recently by
communist China, although it remains to be seen how it will be enforced there. See, e.g.,
id. at 322-24 (discussing contentious debate over constitutional property in South Africa);
XIAN FA art. 13 (1982) (P.R.C.) (amended Mar. 14, 2004) ("Citizens' lawful private prop-
erty is inviolable."); id. art. 10 ("The State may, in the public interest and in accordance
with the provisions of law, expropriate or requisition land for its use and shall make com-
pensation for the land expropriated or requisitioned."). On the other hand, after a lengthy
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The intensity of this debate reflects the centrality and unique-
ness of the right to property among fundamental rights Histori-
cally, the right to private property has been regarded as the central
paradigm for rights in general, and the essential precondition for
the creation of a private sphere of autonomy that forms the foun-
dation of the pluralistic liberal order. Moreover, to the extent that
property rights determine access to the basic means of subsistence,
they are the prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of all other
rights. But at the same time, the right to property is unique in that
the recognition of one person's property rights necessarily implies
a restriction on the property rights of others.' Indeed, to the extent
that the exercise of other rights, such as the freedom of speech or
the right to a fair trial, may depend on possession of property, rec-
ognition of private property rights can have a distorting effect on
the exercise of those other rights as well. The greater the inequal-
ity in the distribution of private property, the more acute this
problem becomes.
Recognition of a fundamental right to property thus has pro-
found consequences for the legal order. It is hardly surprising that
it has been the subject of intense philosophical and legal contro-
versy throughout history. Since ancient times, this debate focused
on the question of whether the right to property is a "natural"
right or merely a creation of* social convention and positive law.
This debate raged from antiquity, through the middle ages, and to
the early modern philosophical discussions of Grotius, Pufendorf,
Locke, and Rousseau. These discussions in turn exerted a pro-
found influence on the recognition of property as a fundamental
right in the first modern written constitutions. Recent controver-
sies in the United States and abroad concerning the nature and
scope of the constitutional right to property are in large part a con-
tinuation of this unresolved debate.
struggle between Parliament and the courts, India repealed its constitutional guarantee of
a fundamental right to property, and more recently Canada and New Zealand decided to
omit such a guarantee from their charters of rights. See generally TOM ALLEN, THE RIGHT
TO PROPERTY IN COMMONWEALTH CONSTITUTIONS 43-54 (2000); ALEXANDER, supra
note 1, at 13, 40-41.
3. Cf. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 4-6 (arguing that separating the public and pri-
vate sphere is not unique to property rights; rather, property is special because it allocates
scarce resources and is foundational for the exercise of other rights).
4. In this respect, the right to property is unlike the right to free speech or a fair trial.
Cf. LAURA UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER 142
(2003) ("[T]he creation of a property regime ... will necessarily protect the interests of
some at the expense of the identical interests of others.").
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The constitutional right to property emerged during the
summer of 1789 when revolutionary assemblies on both sides of
the Atlantic drafted the first modern national constitutional char-
ters of rights. In similar language, both the U.S. Bill of Rights and
the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen pro-
claimed that the government could not seize property except for
public use and on the payment of just compensation.!
To some extent, these eighteenth-century guarantees of prop-
erty rights reflected distinct but largely parallel rhetoric of prop-
erty as an absolute right in both civil law and common law tradi-
tions. At a deeper level, however, the centrality of property rights
for the revolutionaries of the eighteenth century was the result of
common ways of thinking and common influences. Both revolu-
tions reflected the enlightenment attack on aristocratic privilege
and distinctions based purely on birth. Nevertheless, for all their
rhetoric of the natural equality of rights, the revolutionaries were
equally concerned with protecting the inequalities of property,
which they saw as flowing from natural inequalities in ability. De-
spite their differences, it is useful to view the American and
French Revolutions as national expressions of a single revolution-
ary movement that convulsed the entire Atlantic world Compara-
tive study illuminates both the commonalities and the distinctive-
ness of each.
We are only now beginning to appreciate the complexity and
diversity of the intellectual matrix from which the constitutional
right to property emerged. The notion that property, as a natural
and pre-political right, is the source and paradigm of all other
rights is commonly associated with Locke. Certainly this notion
exerted a critical influence on the framers, not only in America, as
has long been realized,7 but also in France, as has more recently
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V; DtCLARATION DES DROITS DE L'HOMME ET DU
CITOYEN DE 1789 art. 17 in STtPHANE RIALS, LA DtCLARATION DES DROITS DE
L'HOMME ET DU CITOYEN 26 (1988).
6. See, e.g., R. R. PALMER, THE AGE OF THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION: A
POLITICAL HISTORY OF EUROPE AND AMERICA, 1760-1800, at 4-6 (1969); JACQUES
GODECHOT, FRANCE AND THE ATLANTIC REVOLUTION OF THE EIGHTEENTH
CENTURY, 1770-1799, at 3-7 (Herbert H. Rowen trans., 1965).
7. See generally LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA: AN
INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT SINCE THE REVOLUTION (2d ed.
1991) (describing the strong influence of Locke in the United States); cf. MARY ANN
GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 20-25
(1991) (noting the distinct treatment given to Locke's theory in the United States, as com-
pared to treatment in England).
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been recognized Locke's assertion that the preservation of prop-
erty was the "great and chief end" of government' resonated pro-
foundly in both countries. Nonetheless, the Lockean rhetoric of
property as a natural and absolute right, with its roots in Aristotle
and Aquinas, was by no means universally embraced by the eight-
eenth-century revolutionaries. Alongside this tradition flourished
another that regarded the right to property as conventional and
thus subject to regulation by society. This competing view can be
traced from Plato and the Hellenistic philosophers, through
Augustine and William of Ockham, all the way to the Enlighten-
ment. In France, it found expression in Rousseau and his follow-
ers, and in America, in the "civic republican" tradition that pro-
foundly influenced figures such as Franklin and Jefferson. Indeed,
even within the natural law tradition, to insist that Grotius, Pufen-
dorf, and Locke regarded property as an unqualified natural right
is an oversimplification. For Grotius and Pufendorf, property was
both natural and conventional, while for Locke, property was
natural in the state of nature, but conventional in civil society.
Modern constitutional discourse, particularly in the United
States, has tended to lose sight of these complexities. Unlike the
French Declaration, the U.S. Constitution never explicitly recog-
nized the right of property per se, much less as a "natural" right,
but was content to protect such property rights as had been cre-
ated by positive law through the Contract, Due Process, and Tak-
ings Clauses. Nevertheless, judicial interpretation over the course
of more than two centuries gradually imported natural law con-
cepts, using them to construct doctrines of public use, substantive
due process, and regulatory takings. The incoherence of much of
modern constitutional property rights jurisprudence is the direct
result of the uncritical application of an absolutist rhetoric of natu-
ral rights.
This Article explores the emergence and development of the
right to property as a fundamental constitutional right with the
hope of illuminating these issues. Part Two of this Article surveys
the philosophical and legal debate that formed the background for
the emergence of the constitutional right to property. It traces the
transition from the ancient debate as to whether property as an in-
8. RIALS, supra note 5, at 13 (recognizing that the drafters of the French Declaration
owed "infinitely more" to Locke than to Rousseau).
9. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 368-69 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1967) (1690).
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stitution was natural or conventional, through the medieval re-
conceptualization of property as a right, to the early modern
elaborations of the theories of natural rights and the social con-
tract. Part Three explores in greater detail the intellectual matrix
in which property was inscribed as a fundamental right in the first
modern constitutions in France and America. Its aim is not to re-
duce these provisions to a simple "original understanding," but
rather to explore the complexities and tensions that animated
them. Finally, Part Four explores how the debate over property as
a natural or a conventional right continues to shape constitutional
doctrine in the United States. The Article concludes that an abso-
lutist rhetoric of property as a purely individual and natural right
has tended to impoverish our constitutional discourse, and that a
recovery of the notion of property as a conventional, civic, and so-
cial right holds the promise of enriching it.
II. THE LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATE OVER PROPERTY
A. The Ancient World: Origins of the Debate over Property as a
Natural or Conventional Institution
The ancient debate over property took place against the back-
ground of a persistent tradition that early man held all things in
common during a primitive Golden Age of abundance." In Greek
and Roman literature, this idea first appeared in Hesiod, and re-
curred repeatedly thereafter throughout the works of classical my-
thographers, poets, historians, and philosophers.1' The ancients
widely associated common property with a primitive natural sim-
plicity, and private property with moral corruption and injustice.2
The problem was to explain in what sense private property could
be justified in accordance with nature, if it was not natural in a
chronological sense.
The association between property and moral corruption is
central to Plato's thought. Because he believed that property cor-
10. See BODO GATZ, WELTALTER, GOLDENE ZEIT, UND SINNVERWANDTE
VORSTELLUNGEN (1967).
11. For an exhaustive survey, see ARTHUR 0. LOVEJOY & GEORGE BOAS,
PRIMITIVISM AND RELATED IDEAS IN ANTIQUITY 117-52 (Octagon Books 1965) (1935).
For example, in the Georgics, Virgil states that in the Golden Age, "it was not even right
[fas] to mark off or to divide the land with boundaries." Id. at 370 (quoting VIRGIL,
GEORGICS I 126-27 (Otto Ribbeck ed., Leipzig 1898)).
12. See LOVEJOY & BOAS, supra note 11, at 119.
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rupts, Plato concluded that the rulers of an ideal state should have
no property.'3 In his Republic, he famously forbade the Guardians
or ruling caste in his ideal state to possess any property in land,
houses, or money." In Plato's view, if the rulers possess property,
they will place their personal interests above the common wel-
fare;"5 by prohibiting it, he sought to prevent quarrels and faction-
alism and insure unity in the state.16 Among the lower classes, such
as farmers, craftsmen, and traders, which comprised the vast bulk
of the people, he suggested that private property should be al-
lowed, but extremes of wealth and poverty must be prevented.17
In the Laws, where Plato attempted to prescribe rules for a
practical rather than an ideal state, he recognized that the ideal of
the community of Guardians in the Republic, where "every sort of
property is common," and "every device has been employed to ex-
clude the 'private' from all aspects of life," may be unattainable. 8
For such a state to function, its inhabitants must be either "gods or
children of gods."' 9 In the Laws, therefore, he elaborated a "sec-
ond-best" alternative, one that is as close to the perfect state as
practicable." All land in the state should be divided into roughly
equal private allotments, one for each household.2' However, the
individual shareholders may not sell any part of their allotments
and must treat them like state property, even though the state may
not confiscate them. Furthermore, accumulation of chattels is sub-
ject to strict limitations.22
Aristotle, in the Politics, attacked these egalitarian proposals
and defended the institution of private property. Aristotle argued
that Plato's attempt to secure complete unity in the state was im-
possible; in order to be self-sufficient, a state must consist of a plu-
13. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 184 (Desmond Lee trans., Penguin Books 1974).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 185.
16. Id. at 249-50.
17. Id. at 187-88.
18. PLATO, THE LAWS OF PLATO 126 (Thomas L. Pangle trans., 1980).
19. Id. at 126.
20. Id. at 125-26.
21. Id. at 126-27.
22. Id. at 127, 247. The system of land allotments and restrictions on alienation out-
lined in Plato's laws appears to reflect widespread early practice in a number of early
Greek jurisdictions, including Sparta, Locri, Crete, and most likely early Athens as well.
See GLENN R. MORROW, PLATO'S CRETAN CITY: A HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION OF
THE LAWS 107-09 (2d. ed. 1993) (1960).
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rality of different kinds of men. ' Aristotle also briefly introduces a
utilitarian argument that is the ancestor of most modern defenses
of private property. Aristotle observed: "People are much more
careful of their own possessions than of those communally owned;
they exercise care over public property only in so far as they are
personally affected."2 The argument that a common ownership
creates a disincentive for efficient use of property (the "tragedy of
the commons") is the centerpiece of the economic argument for
private ownership today; but for Aristotle it was of rather marginal
importance.' Finally, Aristotle adduced psychological and ethical
arguments in support of private property: it satisfied an innate
human urge to possess, and enabled people to engage in private
acts of generosity."
Although Aristotle defended the institution of private prop-
erty, he was far from espousing modern notions of property as a
human right. Indeed, the Politics opens with a defense of slavery,
the idea that some human beings are without rights, as a natural
institution: "It is clear that by nature some are free, others are
slaves, and for these it is both right and expedient that they should
serve as slaves."27 Aristotle's natural slavery is rooted in racial dif-
ferences. In his words, "as the poets say, 'It is proper that Hellenes
should rule over barbarians,' meaning that barbarian and slave are
by nature identical."' If these "barbarians" should refuse to sub-
mit, Aristotle suggests, it is "part of nature's plan" and "by nature
right" to hunt them down and enslave them.29 The link between
property and slavery as "natural" institutions would persist to the
time of Locke, Madison, and beyond.
The quarrel between Plato and Aristotle framed the terms of
subsequent debate over the institution of private property. The
central questions of this debate were whether this institution was
"natural," and what it means for an institution to be "natural."
23. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 56-58 (T.A. Sinclair trans., Penguin Books 1962).
24. Id. at 58.
25. As one commentator has observed, in the Politics the utilitarian justification of
property "appears as a marginal point and is not emphasized; when Aristotle constructed
his own sketch for a perfect state he paid little heed to his own argument that private
property is necessary as an incentive to work: he made half the land of the state public
property and stipulated that it should be tilled by public slaves." RICHARD SCHLATrER,
PRIVATE PROPERTY: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 15 (1951).
26. ARISTOTLE, supra note 23, at 63-64.
27. Id. at 34.
28. Id. at 26-27.
29. Id. at 40.
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Unlike Aristotle, the philosophical movements that dominated the
Hellenistic and Roman worlds until the triumph of Christianity
generally held that the institution of private property is not natu-
ral. This was the position of the Cynics, ° the Epicureans, 31 and
most influentially, the Stoics. 2 As Seneca explained, private prop-
erty arose only because avarice led people to seek more than na-
ture and reason require.3 The divergent views of ancient philoso-
phers on the question of whether private property is "natural"
reflect the differing understandings of the term "nature" itself.'
The primary etymological meaning of "nature" is origin or birth."
This is the sense in which property is said to be unnatural accord-
ing to the myth of the Golden Age, viewed as a reflection of a his-
torical stage in which humankind lived without private property.
But in literary and philosophical usage, "nature" comes to be asso-
ciated with the essential qualities of a person, thing, or institution. 6
In The Republic, Plato identifies "nature" with the ideal;37 thus pri-
vate property, which undermines the unity essential to the ideal
state, is unnatural. In the Politics, Aristotle understands "nature"
teleologically: "[W]hatever is the end-product of the perfecting
process of any object, that we call its nature .... Moreover, the
aim and the end can only be that which is best, perfection; and self-
sufficiency is both end and perfection." 8 Thus, Aristotle concluded
that private property is natural because he believed that it is re-
quired for the state to be self-sufficient. The Stoics identified "na-
ture" with reason (the logos).9 Private property does not arise
naturally, but only when irrational avarice leads people to seek
more than nature and reason require.
Of all these philosophical approaches, Stoicism exerted the
most profound influence over Roman legal thinking. Like Cyni-
30. See generally LOVEJOY & BOAS, supra note 11, at 117-52.
31. Id. at 233 (quoting LUCRETIUS, DE RERUM NATURA 5.1113-19 (Merrill 1907)).
32. See generally id. at 273 (quoting SENECA, EPISTOLAE MORALES 90.34 (Otto
Hense ed., Leipzig 1914)).
33. Id. at 271 (quoting SENECA, EPISTOLAE MORALES 90.10 (Otto Hense ed., Leipzig
1914)).
34. Lovejoy and Boas identified sixty-six different meanings of this term (Greek phu-
sis, Latin natura). See id. at 447-56.
35. Id. at 447.
36. Id. app. A2, at 447.
37. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, supra note 13, at 424.
38. ARISTOTLE, supra note 23, at 28.
39. See LOVEJOY & BOAS, supra note 11, at 270-71 (quoting SENECA, EPISTOLAE
MORALES 90.10, 24 (Otto Hense ed., Leipzig 1914)).
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cism and Epicureanism, Stoicism was originally potentially a so-
cially subversive philosophy; but unlike them, it was not implaca-
bly hostile to engagement in politics. In fact, it was eventually
pressed into the service of the Roman State as a quasi-official im-
perial ideology. The philosophers of the middle Stoa, such as Pan-
aetius, Posidonius, and Polybius, became apologists for oligarchic
imperial government and saw the emergence of the Roman Cos-
mopolis as the fulfillment of a divine plan.' In the early Roman
Empire, eclectic Stoics such as Seneca discarded the school's ear-
lier advocacy of a mixed constitution and championed instead an
enlightened absolutism." The Stoic doctrines of the brotherhood of
man and universal law of reason also had a certain expediency in
the context of the worldwide Roman Empire. This insured its wide
diffusion alongside other perhaps less expedient and even more
potentially subversive ideas, such as the notion that human equal-
ity is natural and private property is not.2
The influence of Stoic doctrines of property on Roman law
was nevertheless at best partial and incomplete. It is true that the
great jurist Ulpian repeated the Stoic doctrine that all men are
equal according to natural law. 3 Likewise, the Institutes of Justin-
ian insisted that slavery is contrary to natural law (ius naturale)
and is merely the result of social convention, albeit one recognized
in the law of all nations (ius gentium) in the ancient world." But
elsewhere, unfortunately, Roman jurists did not always so clearly
distinguish between the ius naturale and the ius gentium. In fact,
immediately before asserting that slavery is a creation of the ius
gentium and not the ius naturale, the Institutes defined the latter in
a way that conflates it with the former: "The law which natural
reason appoints for all mankind obtains equally among all nations,
40. See BENJAMIN FARRINGTON, SCIENCE AND POLITICS IN THE ANCIENT WORLD
172-216 (2d ed. 1965).
41. See DONALD R. DUDLEY, A HISTORY OF CYNICISM: FROM DIGOENES TO THE
6TH CENTURY A.D., at 128-29 (1937); MIRIAM T. GRIFFIN, SENECA: A PHILOSOPHER IN
POLITICS 141-48 (1976); cf. CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, THE GROWTH OF
POLITICAL THOUGHT IN THE WEST: FROM THE GREEKS TO THE END OF THE MIDDLE
AGES 105-06 (12th prtg. 1960).
42. MCILWAIN, supra note 41, at 106.
43. "Quod ad ius naturale attinet, omnes homines aequales sunt." ("As far as natural
law is concerned all men are equal.") ("As far as concerns the civil law slaves are regarded
as not existing, not, however, in the natural law, because as far as concerns the natural law
all men are equal.") DIG. 50.17.32 (Ulpian, Sabinus 43) (Theodor Mommsen et al. eds.,
1985).
44. See J. INST. 1.3.2; 1.2.2.
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and is called the law of nations, because all nations make use of
it." 5 The authors of the Institutes apparently did not feel the need
to explain the apparent conflict between their assertion that slav-
ery is contrary to natural law and their implication that as a crea-
tion of the law of nations, slavery reflects natural reason.
This confusion in the Roman legal literature is even more
acute when we turn from discussions of slavery to discussions of
property in general. The Roman legal sources appear to be hope-
lessly inconsistent as to whether the institution of private property
is natural or conventional. ' To some extent, this may reflect dif-
ferences of opinion among different legal authorities. The compil-
ers of Justinian's Corpus Iuris Civilis were more concerned with
practical rather than with theoretical consistency (although, of
course, they did not always succeed in achieving even the for-
mer). 7 But to some extent it reflects confusion or carelessness of
the original authorities themselves. For example, Gaius clearly
treats natural and conventional law fairly indiscriminately.' Other
authorities, such as Ulpian, seem to draw a distinction between the
two, even if they do not pursue it in a systematic way. At least one
passage in the Digest of Justinian, attributed to Hermogenianus,
seems to draw the distinction more clearly and to suggest that pri-
vate property is a creation of the ius gentium rather than the ius
naturale."9 The most we can conclude from this is that the Stoic
theory of property was only incompletely incorporated into Ro-
man legal doctrine.
The specific question of expropriation, which is the focus of
much of the modem debate over constitutional property rights, re-
ceived little sustained discussion in the Roman legal literature.
45. See J. INST. 1.2.1. This formulation is taken almost verbatim from Gaius. See G.
INST. 1.1 (F. de Zulueta ed.).
46. See SCHLATrER, supra note 25, at 27-30.
47. See id. at 27.
48. As Schlatter notes, in the Institutes, Gaius treats acquisition by occupation, acces-
sion, and tradition as belonging to the ius naturale, but in other treatises that have been
excerpted in the Digest, he states that they belong to the ius gentium. Id. at 27.
49. DIG. 1.1.5 (Hermogenian, Epitome of Law 1) (Theodor Mommsen et al. eds.,
1985) ("Ex hoc iure gentium introducta bella, discretae gentes, regna condita, dominia dis-
tincta, agris termini positi .... " ["As a consequence of this jus gentium, wars were intro-
duced, nations differentiated, kingdoms founded, properties individuated .... "]). Carlyle
suggested that this passage seems to indicate that Hermogenianus considered private
property conventional rather than natural. See R.W. & A.J. CARLYLE, The Second Cen-
tury to the Ninth, in A HISTORY OF MEDIAEVAL POLITICAL THEORY IN THE WEST: VOL.
I, at 42, 53-54 (3d ed. 1930).
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That literature is overwhelmingly concerned with private law. To
attempt an exposition of public law, which was far more dependent
than private law on the whim of the emperor, would have been at
best somewhat pointless and at worst even dangerous. But there
can be little doubt that the Roman state exercised the power of
eminent domain, for "it is impossible to believe that the construc-
tion of the Roman roads, extending in a straight line from one end
of the Empire to the other, or of the Roman aqueducts, was at the
mercy of the owners of the land through which they were to
pass.""0 Expropriation for redistributive purposes also loomed
large throughout Roman history, whether to alleviate economic
distress, to reward veterans for military service, or merely to settle
scores or to gain political advantage. Many of these transfers in-
volved ager publicus-land initially acquired by the Roman state
in the course of its expansion and in which the state retained a re-
versionary interest.' Compensation appears to have been gener-
ally paid in the case of public works but not redistribution.2 Regu-
lation of property uses was also widespread and was not
accompanied by compensation. 3
The Roman law of property, therefore, had a strong compo-
nent of social obligation. The common claim that ownership in
Roman law was purely individualistic and absolute-which contin-
ues to be repeated even in our own day" despite having been de-
bunked more than a century ago by Jhering"-cannot be squared
with historical facts. That it could be regarded as plausible is a con-
sequence of the almost exclusively private law focus of the Roman
legal writers, which led them to neglect issues of government regu-
lation and expropriation. 6 The natural law theorists of the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries, in their enthusiasm to strengthen
private property as a weapon in the struggle against feudalism and
absolutism, "turned to the Roman law for the support they were
50. J. Walter Jones, Expropriation in Roman Law, 45 L.Q. REV. 512, 521 (1929).
51. See id. at 514-16.
52. See id. at 516.
53. See id. at 518.
54. See, e.g., RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM 11 (1999) ("The rights im-
plicit in dominium were so absolute that ancient Rome knew nothing of eminent do-
main.").
55. RUDOLF VON IHERING, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END 386-87 (Isaac Husik tr.
1968) (1913) (German original 1877).
56. Jones, supra note 50, at 519-20, 526.
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determined to find,"57 and rested their arguments on the supposed
doctrine of the inviolability of property that was in fact largely the
creation of the glossators and commentators.' If Roman law did
not fully embrace the Stoic idea that private property is contrary to
nature, neither did it embrace the conceit of Bartolus and Black-
stone that the rights of ownership are absolute.
Although the ancient debate over whether private property is
"natural" still has enormous resonance in modern times, we must
not lose sight of the important ways in which ancient conceptions
of property differed from our own. First, the ancients conceived of
the role of property primarily in civic or social rather than eco-
nomic terms. In antiquity, private property, which essentially
meant land, was a largely static institution that had little in com-
mon with our modern dynamic capitalist conception of property.
Its goal was autarky rather than wealth maximization. In Greece,
land ownership was "an exclusive prerogative of citizens"59; it was
the basis of the Solonic classes in Athens and thus determined civic
rights and responsibilities.' Similarly, it was the basis of the system
of honorific orders in Rome and largely determined social and po-
litical privileges." The pursuit of profit through investment or
commerce was considered unsuitable for leading citizens. Their
wealth furnished them with the leisure to pursue the good of the
state but was not a goal in itself.62 As Moses Finley has put it: "In-
vestment in land ... was never in antiquity a matter of systematic,
calculated policy, of what Weber called economic rationality." 3
Indeed, there was no "recognizable real-property market" in the
modern sense.' Ownership of property in land was bound up with
civic and political participation in ways that still seemed familiar in
the eighteenth century, when the first written constitutions
emerged, but that seem alien today in the twenty-first.
57. Id. at 520.
58. Id. at 519-20.
59. M. 1. FINLEY, THE ANCIENT ECONOMY 48 (updated ed. 1999).
60. See id. at 48-49.
61. See generally id. at 44-46 (describing the evolution of the categories of social divi-
sion in the Roman world, which viewed property ownership not as an "occupation," but
rather an unstated prerequisite for being classified in the higher levels of society).
62. See id. at 49-50 (describing the middle class, who were businessmen, engaging in
various business activities in communities where the very same businessmen were collect-
ing taxes for the state).
63. Id. at 117, 144.
64. Id. at 118.
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Second, even if Aristotle and some of the Roman jurists re-
garded the institution of property as natural, it does not necessarily
follow that they had a conception of property as a natural right,
much less a fundamental or universal human right. Indeed, it has
often been argued that the ancients lacked a conception of "rights"
in the modern sense at all; certainly they had no counterpart to our
modern discourse of rights.6" Arguably, the jurists such as Ulpian
who incorporated Stoic conceptions of freedom, equality, and hu-
man dignity into the doctrines of Roman law laid the groundwork
for our modern notions of human rights. ' But it remains true that,
on the whole, the Roman jurists never distinguished clearly be-
tween positive and natural law, and "never developed what may be
called the revolutionary aspect of natural law as a higher law capa-
ble of invalidating the positive law."67 The emergence of a dis-
course on fundamental rights, and in particular of the notion of
property as a fundamental right, was a development of medieval
and early modern thought.
B. The Middle Ages and the Emergence of the Individual Right to
Property
The early Christian Church, like many of the pagan philoso-
phers, was deeply critical of private property. Jesus counseled
those seeking salvation to renounce their property,68 and following
his precepts, the earliest Christians rejected private property and
held "all things in common."69 The early Church Fathers drew on
these Christian teachings as well as their Stoic antecedents to de-
velop a theoretical argument that private property is contrary to
nature.7" For them, the pagan Golden Age corresponded to the
biblical Garden of Eden." Saint Ambrose took directly from
65. See, e.g., ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (2d ed. 1984); MICHEL
VILLEY, LA FORMATION DE LA PENStE JURIDIQUE MODERNE 227-39 (4th ed. 1975); LEO
STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 120-21 (1953). One recent study has taken is-
sue with these views, arguing that Aristotle did possess a concept of rights based on natu-
ral justice. FRED D. MILLER, JR., NATURE, JUSTICE, AND RIGHTS IN ARISTOTLE'S
POLITICS 88-89 (1995). But Miller concedes that Aristotle did not conceive of such rights
as inherent, inalienable, or universal. Id. at 88.
66. See TONY HONORt, ULPIAN: PIONEER OF HUMAN RIGHTS 76 (2d ed. 2002).
67. BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 55 (1962).
68. Matthew 19:21; cf id. 19:24; 6:19: 10:9-10; Luke 3:11; 12:33; 18:22.
69. Acts 4:32; see also id. 2:44-45 ("Now all those who believed ... had all things in
common, and sold their possessions and goods.")
70. SCHLATTER, supra note 25, at 33-34.
71. Id. at 35.
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Cicero and the Stoics the idea that by nature all things are held in
common. Saint Augustine elaborated the doctrine that private
property is the result of sin and the "Fall of Man."72 But Augustine
rejected the claim that Christians are forbidden from owning
property: Although property is not a creation of natural law, it is
sanctioned by human law. Nevertheless, Augustine insists that
ownership is contingent upon righteous use." Accordingly, the
property of heretics is subject to confiscation because "all that
which is badly possessed is the property of another."7 Thus for
Augustine, private property is "neither absolute nor inviolable, but
relative and conditional.""
By the later Middle Ages, however, the Church had largely
reconciled itself to the institution of private property. Saint Tho-
mas Aquinas explained that an institution can be natural in one of
two ways: It can either exist in the original state of nature or it can
be dictated by natural reason because it is beneficial.76 It is in this
second sense, according to the Angelic Doctor, that both private
property and slavery are natural: "[T]he distinction of possessions
and slavery were not brought in by nature, but devised by human
reason for the benefit of human life. Accordingly, the law of na-
ture was not changed in this respect, except by addition."77 In the
Summa Theologica, Aquinas repeated all of the arguments of Ar-
istotle in favor of private property. But he did not develop them
much further. In his concept of the state, "there was no place for a
theory of individual rights. The ruler was bound by natural law to
maintain the general system of private ownership ... but he was
not bound to respect as a natural right the property of any one
man. 7 ' His pupils, particularly Aegidius Romanus, sought to pro-
vide further support to his theory that private property is natural
by appealing to the idea of the social contract. 9 At the same time,
Aegidius developed the theory, pioneered by Augustine, of do-
72. Id. at 35-38.
73. Id. at 38.
74. Id. (quoting AUGUSTINE, PATROLOGIAE LATINAE, vol. 33, letter 153, 6, 26,
translated in Richard McKeon, The Development of the Concept of Property, in 48 ETHICS
297 (1938)).
75. D.J. MacQueen, St. Augustine's Concept of Property Ownership, in 8
RECHERCHES AUGUSTINIENNES 187, 220 (1972).
76. See THOMAS AQUINAS, 1 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Q. 94, art. 5, at 65 (1949).
77. Id. at 65.
78. SCHLATrER, supra note 25, at 50.
79. Id. at 58; see J.W. GOUGH, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: A CRITICAL STUDY OF ITS
DEVELOPMENT 41-42 (1936).
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minion in grace-the idea that all ownership rights depend ulti-
mately upon God, and therefore upon righteous conduct.'
The most important theological contributions to the devel-
opment of the theory of individual rights and of the rights of prop-
erty in particular came not from the Dominican Aquinas and his
pupils but from their rivals, the Franciscans. According to Michel
Villey, the Franciscan Order was the cradle and William of Ock-
ham was the "father" of the modern concept of subjective rights."
For Ockham, property is not natural but rather a creation of hu-
man positive law. Nevertheless, property is immune from expro-
priation by both pope and emperor. More recent scholarship,
without disputing the importance of Ockham, has argued that the
development of subjective rights was a more gradual process than
Villey suggested.n In any case, by the later Middle Ages, a concept
of subjective individual rights had clearly emerged, which was to
provide the foundation for modern individualistic theories of
property rights.
Alongside these theological discussions, the rediscovery and
ensuing revival of Roman law in the eleventh century also led to
important developments in the theory of property rights. The Ro-
manist jurists of the late middle ages, unlike the Romans them-
selves, first felt the need to articulate an abstract definition of
property. Beginning with Bartolus in the fourteenth century, they
defined property (dominium) as "the right of complete control
over a physical object, to the extent not prohibited by law" (ius de
re corporali perfecte disponendi nisi lege prohibeatur)."3 This defini-
tion is repeated with minor modifications from one civilian author-
ity to the next through Domat and Pothier to the French Civil
Code of 1804, and from there in the other modern codes of the ci-
vilian tradition.' It is echoed in the common law in the even more
80. SCHLATIER, supra note 25, at 62.
81. VILLEY, supra note 65, at 226; cf id. at 176-262.
82. See generally BRIAN TIERNEY, THE IDEA OF NATURAL RIGHTS: STUDIES ON
NATURAL RIGHTS, NATURAL LAW AND CHURCH LAW 1150-1625, at 151-153 (John
Witte, Jr. ed., 1997) (describing the philosopher Bonagratia of Bergamo's theory of prop-
erty).
83. ALFONS BURGE, DAS FRANZOSISCHE PRIVATRECHT IM 19. JAHRHUNDERT:
ZWISCHEN TRADITION UND PANDEKTENWISSENSCHAFT, LIBERALISMUS UND
ETATISMUS 5 (1991) (quoting BARTOLUS, COMMENTARY on DIG. 41.2.17); cf id. at 3-63.
84. "La propri6t6 est le droit de jouir et disposer des choses de la mani~re la plus ab-
solue, pourvu qu'on n'en fasse un usage prohib6 par les lois ou par les r~glements."
["Property is the right to enjoy and dispose of things in the most absolute manner pro-
vided that the use is not prohibited by laws or regulations."]. C. CIV. art. 544 (Fr.).
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extravagant language of Blackstone. But in addition to this defini-
tion applying rather narrowly to ownership of tangible property,
Bartolus also offers a second and broader definition of dominium.
Property, he says, "may be used to refer in the broadest sense to
every incorporeal right, as in 'I have property in an obligation, for
example in a usufruct."' (potest appellari largissime pro omni iure
incorporali, ut habeo dominium obligationis, utputa usufructus).'
This broader definition would in time find an echo in Locke.'
The medieval Romanists were also concerned with articulat-
ing general principles governing the limits of private property
rights and expropriation in particular. As we have seen, the surviv-
ing Roman sources do not provide a general theory of expropria-
tion, although they provide glimpses of expropriation procedures
governing particular situations (such as the building of aque-
ducts). 7 At most, they furnish a variety of seemingly contradictory
principles, such as Princeps legibus solutus es?' (the sovereign is
not bound by laws) and Digna vox maiestate regnantis legibus alli-
gatum se principem profiterin (it befits the majesty of the ruler for
the sovereign to profess himself to be bound by the laws). The me-
dieval canonists and Romanists, concerned above all with con-
structing a consistent theory out of such contradictory statements,
gradually developed a general theory of expropriation.'
Feudalism, with its complex network of overlapping rights of
kings, manorial lords, ecclesiastical authorities, and municipalities,
formed the political and socioeconomic background for this devel-
opment.9' In France, despite the increasing centralization of power
in the hands of the king, these overlapping jurisdictions character-
istic of feudalism continued to play an important role in the law of
property until the end of the ancien regime, ensuring a wide diver-
sity of approaches to expropriation. Some jurisdictions applied an
extremely lax standard of public utility, while in others a strict
85. E.J.H. Schrage, lus in re corporali perfecte disponendi: Property from Bartolus to
the New Dutch Civil Code of 1992, in PROPERTY LAW, supra note 1, at 44 (quoting
BARTOLUS, COMMENTARY on DIG. 41.2.17 (no. 4)) (I have supplied my own translation
of Bartolus).
86. See infra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
87. See Jones, supra note 50, at 521-22.
88. DIG. 1.3.31 (Ulpian, Lex Julia et Papia 13).
89. CODE JUST. 1.14.4 (Theodosius & Valentinian-Caesar 429).
90. This evolution is traced in detail in UGO NICOLINI, LA PROPRIETA, IL PRINCIPE,
E L' ESPROPRIAZIONE PER PUBBLICA UTILITA (1952).
91. See Jean-Louis Mestre, L'Expropriation Face i la Proprite (Du Moyen Age au
Code Civil), in 1 DROITS: REVUE FRANCAISE DE THtOR1E JURIDIQUE 53 (1985).
[Vol. 29:201216
2007] Property as a Natural and Conventional Right
standard of public necessity prevailed. Compensation was some-
times forthcoming immediately, and in some jurisdictions ex-
ceeded the market value of the property; elsewhere the victims of
expropriation had to wait decades for compensation, and some-
times funds for compensation were simply unavailable.92 However,
the general rule was well established, at least in theory: Property
could only be taken for public utility or necessity, and only upon
payment of just compensation.
In England, where the feudal system, originally the strongest
in Europe, disintegrated more rapidly than on the continent, Par-
liament increasingly claimed a monopoly of the power to expro-
priate. Although the King exercised certain prerogative powers
over private property (primarily in connection with his authority
over defense, foreign affairs, and navigation) without the need to
pay compensation or secure the consent of Parliament, these pow-
ers were limited in scope and did not include the power to acquire
estates in land.93 The Crown recognized formal limitations on such
powers beginning in 1215, when the barons extracted from King
John the promise that "no free man shall be ... disseised .. . save
by the lawful judgment of his peers or the law of the land." 4 The
power of eminent domain, on the other hand, belonged exclusively
to Parliament, at least by the fifteenth century. 5 As a formal mat-
ter, no independent requirement of public use or of compensation
limited this power: any such limitation would be inconsistent with
parliamentary sovereignty. In practice, however, compensation
was generally paid and the courts tended to presume that compen-
sation was intended, absent clear evidence to the contrary. The
theoretical justification for this exclusive power was increasingly
found in social contractarian theories of limited government. A
critical figure in these theoretical developments was Sir John
Fortescue, the fifteenth-century Chief Justice of the Court of
92. In Provence, for example, those whose lands were expropriated regularly received
a twenty percent premium (le "quint en sus") over the fair market value of their property.
In Lille, on the other hand, compensation to owners of property taken when the city was
enlarged in 1668 was only paid in 1732. In 1783, at least fifteen administrative districts
lacked adequate funds to compensate property owners for expropriation. See id. at 60-61.
93. See William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L.
REV. 553, 562-64 (1972).
94. MAGNA CARTA ch. 39 (Nancy Troutman ed., National Public Telecomputing
Network n.d.) (1215), available at http://www.constitution.org/eng/magnacar.htm. This
provision is the ultimate ancestor of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution.
95. See Stoebuck, supra note 93, at 565-66.
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King's Bench, who paved the way for early modern approaches to
property rights.96
C. Early Modern Theories of Property Rights
1. Grotius and Pufendorf
Modern natural rights theories of property began with Hugo
Grotius. Grotius was the first modern philosopher of law to de-
couple the theory of natural rights from theology. In his prolegom-
ena to the De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Grotius famously states that
natural law "would have a degree of validity even if we were to
concede [etiamsi daremus] that which cannot be conceded without
the utmost wickedness, that there is no God, or that the affairs of
men are of no concern to Him."97 Unlike medieval Catholic theo-
logians such as Augustine, Aquinas, and Ockham, the early mod-
ern Protestant theoreticians such as Grotius, Pufendorf, Locke,
and Rousseau, although also profoundly religious, were nonethe-
less concerned with framing their arguments in a universal manner
that could appeal to adherents of all religious beliefs. For the me-
dieval mind, the central question was: How could man own prop-
erty, if the entire universe belonged to its creator God alone? For
the modern mind, on the other hand, the question was: How could
an individual human have a right to property that other humans
are bound to respect? While medieval thought stressed the duty of
the owner to use property in accordance with the purposes of God
(its ultimate owner), modern thought increasingly stressed the
freedom of the owner to use property as he saw fit, provided that
he did not infringe the rights of others. 8 Thus, the separation of
law from theology signaled both a revival of the ancient Stoic con-
ception of natural law as the embodiment of universal reason99 and
96. See CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, THE GROWTH OF POLITICAL THOUGHT IN
THE WEST 354-63 (12th prtg. 1960).
97. HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES (1625), reprinted in 2
CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 13 (James Brown Scott ed., Francis W. Kelsey et al.
trans., 1964).
98. Cf. Marie-France Renoux-Zagam6, Du droit de Dieu au droit de l'homme: Sur les
origins thgologiques du concept moderne de proprigti, in 1 DROITS: REVUE FRAN(AISE DE
THIORIE JURIDIQUE 17, 31 (1985) ("In a world from which God has withdrawn ... man
no longer has a right-as-duty, but a right-as-freedom.").
99. See generally GROTIUS AND THE STOA (Hans W. Blom & Laurens Winkel eds.,
2004).
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strengthened the position that the rights of ownership are abso-
lute.
Nevertheless, Grotius' rationalism does not signal a rejection
of reliance on authority. In fact, the appeal to sacred and secular
authority was central to Grotius' method. Grotius continued the
identification (or confusion) of natural law with the law of nations
that originated in Roman law and persisted throughout the Middle
Ages. According to Grotius, there are two approaches of showing
that a given proposition is a part of natural law: the a priori
method and the a posteriori method. While the a priori method
deduces the principles of natural law directly from the require-
ments of a "rational and social nature," the a posteriori method ar-
gues that, in all probability, those principles are the ones "believed
to be such among all nations, or among all those that are more ad-
vanced in civilization. For an effect that is universal demands a
universal cause. '' "° Although in principle Grotius admits that the
equation of natural law with the law of nations is not infallible, it is
nonetheless a cornerstone, and arguably a serious weakness, of his
approach.'1
Unsurprisingly, given this approach, Grotius accepts the an-
cient theory of the original community of goods in the Golden
Age, which he finds confirmed in both biblical and pagan authori-
ties."° Hence, Grotius needs to explain how private property arose
from this original community. Private property, he observes, can-
not be created by a unilateral subjective action, "by a mere act of
will," but only "by a kind of agreement, either expressed, as by a
division, or implied, as by occupation. In fact, as soon as commu-
nity ownership was abandoned, and as yet no division had been
made, it is to be supposed that all agreed, that whatever each one
had taken possession of should be his property." 103 Thus, Grotius'
theory of the origin of property rights is essentially contractarian.
However, because Grotius views private property as a con-
ventional institution established to serve specific rational social
100. GROTIUS, supra note 97, at 42. Already in the De Jure Praedae Grotius had gone
even further and suggested that natural law may be divined by consulting to the eminent
authorities. See HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE PRAEDAE COMMENTARIUS (1604), reprinted
in CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 226 (Gladys L. Williams & Walter H. Zeydel
trans., 1964).
101. See STEPHEN BUCKLE, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF PROPERTY:
GROTIUS TO HUME 5-6 (1991).
102. See GROTIUS, supra note 97, at 186-87.
103. Id. at 189-90.
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ends, he holds that it is limited by those ends. These limitations are
manifest in his doctrine of the revival of the common right to use
in cases of extreme necessity and his doctrine of eminent domain.
Grotius maintains that those who have more property than they
need can be compelled to share their belongings with persons who,
through no fault of their own, find themselves in extreme distress.
For Grotius, this right of necessity is rooted in an implicit limita-
tion in the original compact that created private property.'" That
compact must be construed narrowly so as to derogate as little as
possible from the original common right of use, and thus "in direst
need the primitive right of user revives, as if community of owner-
ship had remained."'"5 But Grotius stresses that this revived right
of use must be subject to restrictions. The distressed party must
first seek the owner's permission or judicial approval; the owner
must not be in an equal state of distress; and the distressed party
must make restitution whenever possible. 6
Grotius is also credited with the invention of the term "emi-
nent domain" (jus or dominium eminens), which implies that pub-
lic rights always overlap with private rights to property, and in the
case of public utility, public rights take precedence.'07 Thus, "for
the common good the king has a right of property over the posses-
sions of individuals greater than that of the individual owners.""
Grotius sets two conditions on the exercise of the power of emi-
nent domain: "[T]he first requisite is public advantage; then, that
compensation from the public funds be made, if possible, to the
one who has lost his right."'"
Pufendorf takes a similar approach. Like Grotius, he cites
both biblical and classical authorities as evidence for the primitive
community of goods."' It is thus clear that property is not natural
in the sense of existing in the state of nature or being required by
the law of nature."' Rather, private property is a conventional in-
104. Id. at 193.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 194-95.
107. Id. at 36.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 385.
110. SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO (1672), in 2
CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 547-55 (James Brown Scott ed., C.H. Oldfather &
W.A. Oldfather trans., 1964) (discussing biblical accounts); id. at 542-45 (discussing classi-
cal accounts).
111. Id. at 537.
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stitution resting on "tacit or express" agreements which determine
its extent. "' At most, private property is natural in the limited or
secondary sense that it is useful or advantageous and consistent
with man's reason and social nature."'3 In discussing the social ad-
vantages of a system of private property, Pufendorf relies explicitly
on the same arguments as Aristotle."' In Pufendorf's view, the
most important of these are the claims that private property pre-
vents quarrels and promotes industry."5 He also cites approvingly
Aristotle's argument that private property enables owners to en-
gage in acts of generosity."6
Pufendorf, like Grotius, recognizes that the rights of property
owners are not absolute but involve definite social responsibilities.
He emphasizes that private property was not established merely
for "the purpose of allowing a man to avoid using it in the service
of others, and to brood in solitude over his hoard of riches. '"7
Thus, like Grotius, he recognizes that those in extreme need may
have a right to the property of others."' However, he differs
slightly from his Dutch predecessor as to the theory on which such
a right is based and the conditions under which it may be exer-
cised. "' Pufendorf also discusses the theory of eminent domain at
greater length than Grotius. He distinguishes between absolute
monarchies and states in which the government has only limited
power. Taking issue with Hobbes, Pufendorf argues that only in
the former does government have untrammeled power to seize the
possessions of its subjects at its pleasure and without compensa-
tion. He suggests that such a state of affairs is typical of oriental
despotism and "is the reason why those lands, otherwise so fa-
voured, are daily sinking lower in ignorance, barbarity and pov-
erty, or at least do not enjoy the prosperity seen in most of the
kingdoms of Europe."'2 ° Under European limited governments, on
the other hand, the sovereign has "only so much 'power" over the
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. Id. at 541.
115. Id. at 301.
116. Id. at 541.
117. Id. at 301.
118. Id. at 302.
119. See id. at 301-07. Pufendorf differs with Grotius in preferring to treat this right of
necessity as a positive right rather than a revival of the original natural use right. He also
stresses that such a right can only be claimed by one who falls into a state of necessity
through no fault of his own. For further discussion, see BUCKLE, supra note 101, at 108-17.
120. PUFENDORF, supra note 110, at 1275.
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property of citizens "as flows of itself from the nature of supreme
sovereignty, unless the citizens of themselves have voluntarily
given up more."'.2' These powers are threefold: taxation, eminent
domain, and regulation of the use of property (for example, by
sumptuary laws). 22
According to Pufendorf, the conditions for the exercise of
eminent domain are necessity and compensation. Although
Pufendorf's "necessity" might seem at first sight a stricter standard
for expropriation than Grotius' "public advantage," Pufendorf is in
fact somewhat vague on this point. He is content to insist that
while the concept of "necessity" does not mean absolute necessity,
it should not be "extended too far" and should be kept "within the
limits of equity" if possible. 123 He gives a few examples, including
seizures of land for military purposes and confiscation of private
stores for distribution in times of famine.12' As for compensation,
Pufendorf explains that it is rooted in the principle of equal treat-
ment." Natural equity requires that each citizen should bear only a
just share of the burdens of government; therefore, anyone com-
pelled to contribute more should be reimbursed.' 6
2. Locke
Grotius and Pufendorf had sought to explain and justify pri-
vate property as an institution based on and limited by social con-
vention and social needs. Under their contractarian approach,
property rights are not absolute and not natural in the strong sense
of being compelled by natural law, but rather in the weaker sense
of being consistent with rational human nature under conditions of
scarcity."' Moreover, it was very much open to doubt whether such
a contract as they posited really existed. As Sir Robert Filmer sar-
castically observed, "Certainly it was a rare felicity, that all the
men in the world at one instant of time should agree together in
one mind to change the natural community of all things into pri-
vate dominion.'2.8 An express contract seems historically implausi-
121. Id. at 1277.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1286.
124. Id. at 1285.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. SCHLATER, supra note 25, at 131.
128. ROBERT FILMER, PATRIARCHA AND OTHER POLITICAL WORKS 273 (Peter Las-
lett ed., 1949) (1680).
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ble, and it is perhaps a stretch to qualify acquiescence in the sei-
zure of land by others as an implied contract. Further, even if the
historical existence of such a contract could be demonstrated, it is
difficult to explain why it should continue to be binding on the cur-
rent generation, which manifestly did not enter into it.
Locke sought to solve all of these difficulties and place the
right to property on a much firmer foundation than his predeces-
sors, a foundation that was prior to and independent of any social
contract. His plan was to show "how Men might come to have a
property in several parts of that which God gave to Mankind in
common, and that without any express Compact of all the Com-
moners.' '29 Beginning with the premise that "every Man has a
Property in his own Person,'3 Locke concludes that man therefore
has a property right to his labor and its fruits. "For this Labour be-
ing the unquestionable Property of the Labourer, no Man but he
can have a right to what that is once joyned to, at least where there
is enough, and as good left in common for others."'' 3' Moreover,
Locke extends this reasoning to explain appropriation not just of
"the Fruits of the Earth, and the Beasts that subsist on it, but the
Earth itself," which is the "chief matter of Property"'32 : "As much
Land as a Man Tills, Plants, Improves, Cultivates, and can use the
Product of, so much is his Property.'.3
Locke's justification of property rights is central to his entire
political theory. In his view, the right to property is not just one
right among many, but the paradigm right and a metaphor for
rights in general. In the passages from his chapter "Of Property" in
the Second Treatise, quoted above, Locke uses the term primarily
in the conventional sense to refer to ownership rights over things,
but he also uses it elsewhere in a broader sense to refer to all rights
to "Life, Liberty, and Estate."'' 4 For Locke, the preservation of
property in this broad sense is the essential function of the state:
"The great and chief end, therefore, of Mens uniting into Com-
monwealths, and putting themselves under Government, is the
Preservation of their Property.'.5
129. LOCKE, supra note 9, at 304.
130. Id. at 305.
131. Id. at 306.
132. Id. at 308.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 341. In his footnote to this passage, Laslett collects many other instances
where Locke uses the term "property" in this broad sense.
135. Id. at 368-69.
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Thus, Locke attempted to ground the right to property in la-
bor in order to demonstrate that it was prior to, and thus, superior
to the claims of the state itself. As has often been observed, this
doctrine was well suited to buttress the claims of the rising bour-
geoisie, whose wealth, in large part, was based on productive activ-
ity. In his First Treatise of Government, Locke argued against both
the absolutist pretensions of monarchs based on divine right and
the aristocratic claims of the nobility to special privileges based on
inherited status.'" Locke's Two Treatises, which appeared in 1690,
articulated the ideological assumptions that had triumphed with
the Glorious Revolution of 1688. His theory owed its enormous
success more to its consistency with the spirit of the times than to
its intrinsic rigor and internal consistency. As Bertrand Russell ob-
served, Locke was the "most fortunate of philosophers," if by no
means the most profound, original, or systematic.'" Serendipi-
tously, he articulated his political theory at the precise time and
place where it perfectly embodied the prevailing wisdom. His lib-
eral ideas were "so completely in harmony with prevailing opinion
in late 17th century England that it is difficult to trace their influ-
ence, except in theoretical philosophy."'' 8 But they had a profound
and revolutionary impact on practical political developments in
France and America more than a century later.
Upon closer examination, the labor theory of property, which
is the foundation of Locke's political theory, presents intractable
problems. It seems somewhat odd, for example, that Locke speaks
of man as having "property" in his person. As Peter Laslett has
pointed out, this language "almost contradicts his first principle
that men belong to God, not themselves.'. 9 And even if we accept
that man is entitled to the fruits of his labor, it is by no means self-
evident that merely by tilling and sowing a field he gains title not
only to the current crop but to the field itself.'0 Most problemati-
cally, Locke's labor theory had potentially revolutionary implica-
tions not just for the feudal order, but for the emerging capitalist
system that was taking its place. For if labor is the natural founda-
tion of the right of property, then the legitimacy of forms of prop-
136. See generally id. at 159-281.
137. BERTRAND RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 600, 605 (1945); cf
id. at 624.
138. Id. at 600-01.
139. LOCKE, supra note 9, at 100.
140. See generally id. at 303-09.
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erty that are not directly the result of labor, such as inheritance,
rent, interest, profit, and so forth, are called into question. And
such forms of property are as common under capitalism as under
feudalism.
However, Locke himself shrank from drawing such revolu-
tionary conclusions. Although he argued that labor is the natural
basis of the right to property, he did not contend that those forms
of property not based in one's own labor are illegitimate. He
makes clear that the right to property is based on labor only in the
state of nature.'4' However, to explain property rights in civil soci-
ety, he is forced to fall back on the same social contract analysis as
Grotius and Pufendorf. "[T]he several Communities settled the
Bounds of their distinct Territories, and by Laws within them-
selves, regulated the Properties of the private Men of their Society,
and so, by Compact and Agreement, settled the Property which
Labour and Industry began.' ' .2
Thus, in his justification of the right to property as an institu-
tion of civil society, Locke blithely retreats from his first principle
that every man owns his person, his labor, and its fruits. He takes it
as self-evident that a master owns the fruit of his servant's labor
just as clearly as he owns the labor of his draft animals: "Thus the
Grass my Horse has bit; the Turfs my Servant has cut; and the Ore
I have digg'd in any place ... become my Property, without the as-
signation or consent of any body. 1 . Moreover, in his discussions
of slavery, Locke involves himself in even greater contortions. For
although he opens the Two Treatises with a ringing condemnation
of slavery as "directly opposite to the generous Temper and Cour-
age of our Nation.,''.. he ends up justifying "the perfect condition
of Slavery, which is nothing else, but the State of War continued,
between a lawful Conquerour, and a Captive.'' 4 However repug-
nant he may have found the notion of enslaving Englishmen,
Locke cheerfully defends the enslavement of Africans, in which he
participated extensively both as an investor and as a colonial ad-
ministrator. '6 In fact, he took special care to justify and protect
slaveholding interests in both the Fundamental Constitutions of
141. See id. at 317.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 307.
144. Id. at 159.
145. Id. at 302.
146. Id. at 303 n.24.
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1669 (which he drafted for Carolina) and the Instructions of 1698
for Governor Nicholson of Virginia. ' One can only conclude, as
Peter Laslett has said, that Locke was "satisfied that the forays of
the Royal Africa Company were just wars."'4 8 A captive in such a
war, Locke insists, has "by his fault, forfeited his Life;" therefore,
he can complain of "no injury."'4 9 In the "perfect condition" in
which they find themselves, slaves are merely the object and not
the subject of rights: "not capable of any Property, [they] cannot in
that state be considered as any part of Civil Society; the chief end
whereof is the preservation of Property. ,1
50
Thus, on close examination, Locke's theory of property is
fraught with unresolved tensions between natural and conven-
tional right. His goal was to establish the right to property (under-
stood both in the narrow sense as "estate" and in the broad sense
as rights in general) as natural and pre-political rather than con-
ventional and thus superior to the claims of the state. However, he
succeeded only in showing how a right to private property based
on labor might hypothetically have emerged in the state of nature.
As for actually existing property rights in civil society, he clearly
believed they remain fundamental and inviolable, even though
they are no longer purely natural but conventional. Property is
sacrosanct even when no longer based on the labor of the proprie-
tor, and even (in the case of property in slaves) when based on the
negation of his first principle that every man owns his own person,
his labor, and its fruits. Though he conceded that property rights
are now the creation of positive convention rather than natural
law, he insisted, somewhat paradoxically, that they remain immune
from positive interference by the law: "The Supream Power cannot
take from any Man any part of his Property without his own con-
sent.."'
Blackstone's account of the origin of private property essen-
tially reiterates Locke's analysis in simplified and exaggerated
form. "' 2 In tones more hyperbolic than even the Romanist authori-
ties, Blackstone defined property as "that sole and despotic do-
minion which one man claims and exercises over the external
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 302.
150. Id. at 341.
151. Id. at 378.
152. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2-*9.
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things of the world, in total exclusion of the rights of any other in-
dividual in the universe." ' In his discussion of eminent domain,
his rhetoric of absolute rights is, if anything, even more extreme
than Locke's:
So great, moreover, is the regard of the law for private prop-
erty, that it will not authorize the least violation of it; no, not
even for the general good of the whole community. If a new
road, for instance, were to be made through the grounds of a
private person, it might perhaps be extensively beneficial to the
public; but the law permits no man, or set of men, to do this
without the consent of the owner of the land.-
As Blackstone well knew, this was an overstatement. Parlia-
ment did in fact frequently force owners to part with their property
without their consent. Blackstone was able to reconcile his abso-
lutist rhetoric with the actual reality of expropriation only through
the oxymoronic notion of compelled consent, conceding that "[i]n
this and similar cases, the legislature frequently does interpose,
and compel the individual to acquiesce" to a proffered indemnifi-
cation.'
3. Rousseau
Rousseau sharply criticized the conceptions of "natural law"
advanced by theorists from ancient to modern times. As we have
seen, the natural law tradition commonly conflated several very
different ideas of the "state of nature." The state of nature is
sometimes conceived as an actual early historical stage of human
development, sometimes as the state in which nations currently ex-
ist with respect to one another, sometimes as a purely hypothetical
state. Corresponding to these ideas are differing conceptions of
natural law as the primordial law governing human society, the law
of nations, and the law of reason respectively. In Rousseau's view,
only the last of these conceptions has any validity.
It is futile, Rousseau argued, to attempt to establish a phi-
losophy of right on a state of nature, which is at best hypothetical,
"a state which no longer exists, perhaps never existed, which
probably never will exist."5 6 Natural law, conceived of as the law of
153. Id. at *2.
154. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *139.
155. Id.
156. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE FIRST AND SECOND DISCOURSES 93 (Roger D.
& Judith R. Masters trans., 1964) (1750 & 1754) [hereinafter ROUSSEAU, DISCOURSES].
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reason, is neither eternal nor unchangeable, much less prior to civil
society: it is unveiled only gradually, as civilized experience gradu-
ally refines human conceptions of justice.'' One cannot deduce a
theory a natural law from the primeval condition of man, nor from
human history, nor from the law of nations. Aristotle, for example,
declared "that men are not naturally equal, but that some are born
for slavery and others for dominion."... However, he "mistook the
effect for the cause.'.. 9 If they appear to be "slaves by nature, the
reason is that men were made slaves against nature."" Similarly,
Grotius' "constant manner of reasoning is to establish right by fact.
A more satisfactory mode might be employed, but none more fa-
vourable to tyrants.' 6 In response to Aristotle, Aquinas, Grotius,
Pufendorf, and Locke, all of whom defended the "right" of slavery,
Rousseau responds that "the right of slavery is ... null, not only
because it is unjustifiable but because it is absurd and has no
meaning. The terms 'slavery' and 'right' contradict and exclude
each other."''
Rousseau's attitudes toward private property underwent
dramatic changes over the course of only a few years. In the Sec-
ond Discourse (the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality of 1755),
he condemned private property as the result of usurpation:
The first person who, having fenced off a plot of ground, took it
into his head to say this is mine and found people simple
enough to believe him, was the true founder of civil society.
What crimes, wars, murders, what miseries and horrors would
the human race have been spared by someone who, uprooting
the stakes or filling in the ditch, had shouted to his fellow-men:
Beware of listening to this impostor; you are all lost if you for-
get that the fruits belong to all and the earth to no one!
16
Although Rousseau accepted the general framework of clas-
sical primitivism, which regarded the state of nature as a golden
age of innocence and the invention of private property as the fruit
of avarice, Rousseau agreed with Locke in identifying labor as the
origin of the right to property:
157. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 18-19 (Charles Frankel ed.
1947) (1762) [hereinafter ROUSSEAU, SOCIAL CONTRACT].
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It is labor alone which, giving the cultivator a right to the prod-
uct of the land he has tilled, gives him the right to the soil as a
consequence, at least until the harvest, and thus from year to
year; which, creating continuous possession, is easily trans-
formed into property.
However, he parted company with Locke in insisting that this
right is "different from the one which results from natural law.' ',
From the introduction of private property flow a host of vices: os-
tentation, deceit, jealousy." As differences of wealth increase, so-
cial conflicts intensify, until finally people resort to the creation of
the civil state, which "destroyed natural freedom for all time, es-
tablished forever the law of property and inequality," and thus,
"changed a clever usurpation into an irrevocable right.' ' 167 The
birth of civil society for Rousseau is thus marked not (as it is for
Locke) by the preservation and extension of natural rights, but
rather (as for Hobbes) by their extinction.
In his subsequent writings, however, Rousseau took a far
more sanguine view of both property and civil society. The change
is evident in his Discourse on Political Economy, written a mere
six months after the Second Discourse. In Political Economy he
declared, "[T]he right of property is the most sacred of all the
rights of the citizens, and more important, in certain respects, than
freedom itself."'"4 The expense of maintaining the state must be
met without attacking this sacred right.9 Finally, in 1762, Rous-
seau set out his theory of property in its most fully-developed form
in The Social Contract. The "right" of occupancy in the state of na-
ture is in fact merely a possessory interest, and not a true property
right; in contrast, the right of property in civil society is a conven-
tional right, but is, nevertheless, infinitely more secure than the
164. Id. at 154.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 157-58.
167. Id. at 160.
168. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, DISCOURS SUR L'ICONOMIE POLITIQUE (1755), in 3
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, OEUVRES COMPLITES 239, 263 (Bernard Gagnebin & Mar-
cel Raymond eds., 1964) [hereinafter ROUSSEAU, L'tCONOMIE POLITIQUE].
169. Id. at 264. Rousseau suggests that the state should be maintained through the
revenues from public land (domaine public), and through taxation, imposed by consent of
the people and its representatives, and ought to apportioned progressively. Only "super-
fluous" property should be taxed; those who possess only the minimum necessary for sub-
sistence ought to pay nothing, both on humanitarian grounds and because they benefit less
from general protection of property than the wealthy. Id. at 264-73.
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natural possessory interest.70 This true right to property emerges
only when individuals uniting to form civil society surrender their
possessory interests to the state, which guarantees them not as a
matter of private right but of public advantage.'
For Rousseau, therefore, property is a conventional civil right
and not a natural right. Private property rights are subordinate to
the public interest, but Rousseau insists that it will never be in the
public interest to violate them. The "paradox" of property as a
conventional right "is that, in accepting the property of individuals,
the community is far from despoiling them, and only ensures them
justifiable possession, changes usurpation into a true right, and en-
joyment into property."'72 Thus, upon entering civil society, indi-
viduals "may be justly said to have acquired all that they gave
up."' 3 As a conventional creation, "the right which each individual
has over his own property is always subordinate to the right which
the community has over all.' '7 Furthermore, "the Sovereign is the
only judge of what is important to the community.' ' 75 Nevertheless,
"the Sovereign cannot, on its side, impose any burden on the sub-
ject useless to the community; it cannot even have the inclination
to do so.'' 6
In his constitutional proposals for Corsica and Poland, Rous-
seau provided a sketch of how his ideas might be implemented in
1771 hpractice. In the Constitutional Proposal for Corsica, he under-
took to design a political and legal system for a society that was
starting from scratch, which "had never yet borne the true yoke of
the law.', 8 Rousseau was therefore able to give his radical ideas
about property free rein. He suggested that the state ought to be
the largest landowner and ought to distribute property to its citi-
zens in accordance with their services: "Far from wishing the state
to be poor I would like instead for it to own everything and for
170. ROUSSEAU, SOCIAL CONTRACr, supra note 157, at 19-22.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 21.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 21-22.
175. Id. at 28.
176. Id.
177. See generally JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, PROJET DE CONSTITUTION POUR LA
CORSE (1772), in 3 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, OEUVRES COMPLtTES 528, 530-31 (1964)
[hereinafter ROUSSEAU, PROJET DE CONSTITUTION].
178. Letter from Matteo Buttafuoco to Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Aug. 31, 1764), in 2
THE POLITICAL WRMNGS OF JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU 296, 366 (C.E. Vaughn ed.,
1915) [hereinafter ROUSSEAU, POLITICAL WRmINGS].
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each to share in the common property only in proportion to his
services."'' 9 His aim, like Plato's in The Laws, was "not to destroy
private property completely, because that is impossible, but to cir-
cumscribe it within the narrowest limits" and, thus, "to keep it al-
ways subject to the public good.""'8 In short, he wished that "the
property of the state be as great and strong and that of the citizens
be as small and weak as possible."' 8'
In Considerations on the Government of Poland, however,
Rousseau appears far more restrained. He dealt here not with a
small island or a tabula rasa, but with an enormous country which
had a long political tradition, entrenched institutions, and, more-
over, powerful neighbors who threatened it with extinction. There-
fore, his first concern was for the preservation of the freedom and
independence of the country, and his suggestions for the reform of
property rights were quite moderate. He did propose that the no-
bility's fiscal exemptions be abolished and replaced with a propor-
tional land tax.'82 Yet despite his fierce attacks elsewhere on exploi-
tation and slavery, Rousseau did not advocate immediate
emancipation of the serfs: "Liberty is a strong food, but it needs a
stout digestion."'83 Therefore, Rousseau argued that only gradual
emancipation could succeed in Poland."
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY
With the emergence of the first modern written constitutions
in the late eighteenth century, the right to property was enshrined
as a fundamental constitutional right. Although Locke's influence
was certainly critical, it would be incorrect to assume, as some
have, that the framers of the first declarations of rights simply con-
stitutionalized Lockean principles. Although the framers generally
agreed on the importance of the right to private property, they did
179. ROUSSEAU, PROJET DE CONSTITUTION, supra note 177, at 93 1.
180. Id.
181. Id. Rousseau recognized the practical obstacles to accomplishing this goal: There
was no large stock of cultivated public land present in Corsica. But he suggested unculti-
vated land could be reclaimed for the state by leasing or corv~es, and that public revenue
could be augmented by taxation. See id.
182. See generally JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, CONSIDtRATIONS SUR LE
GOUVERNEMENT DE POLOGNE ET SUR SA REFORMATION PROJETrtE, in 3 JEAN-
JACQUES ROUSSEAU, OEUVRES COMPLTES 951, 1011-12 (1964) [hereinafter
ROUSSEAU, CONSIDtRATIONS].
183. ROUSSEAU, POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 178, at 382.
184. ROUSSEAU, CONSIDtRATIONS, supra note 182, at 1011-12, 1026-29.
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not agree on the essential nature of this right. Is it natural, pre-
political, and essentially inalterable, or is it conventional and thus
subject to redefinition? Is it exclusively a negative individual right,
or does it entail social responsibilities?
Given the diversity of public opinion concerning these ques-
tions, as well as the gaps in the historical record, it would be folly
to attempt to recover a single "original understanding" of the con-
stitutional right to property. Attempts to elaborate a consistent
originalist constitutional jurisprudence in the United States have
been markedly unsuccessful. "5 The failure of originalism as a the-
ory of constitutional interpretation is nowhere more glaring than
in the field of constitutional property law, where the self-professed
"originalists" on the Supreme Court are perhaps the most cavalier
of all the Justices in their disregard for the original understanding.
In France, originalism has never gained much traction as a method
of constitutional interpretation, and leading constitutional histori-
ans have recognized the futility of seeking to recover a single
"original meaning." As St6phane Rials has written, "How can we
say that the Declaration is clearly this or that, when its provisions
were most often the result of ambiguous agreements among men
who ... each entertained rather different opinions .... ?"' Be-
cause of the insuperable difficulties involved in recovering individ-
ual understandings, aggregating them, and formulating the result
at an appropriate level of generality, Rials suggests, "[e]very pro-
ject that would venture to supply [the Declaration with] a final and
unequivocal meaning is undermined from the start......
185. See, e.g., Bret Boyce, Originalism and the Fourteenth Amendment, 33 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 909 (1998); Thomas Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27
STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975); Karl Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM.
L. REV. 1 (1934); Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Interpretation, 88
COLUM L. REV. 723 (1988); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation,
63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996).
186. RIALS, supra note 5, at 154.
187. Id. at 334. Rials suggests that it is futile not only to attempt to recover a single
original understanding of a constitutional text, but even to recover a single animating phi-
losophy underlying it:
Here are Tablets of the Law that are the result of cutting and pasting and patch-
ing, the fruit of negotiations, transactions, and agreements whose subjective
meaning varied from one representative to another... Can we say that the Dec-
laration provides us with a common formulation of the spirit of certain elites of
the time? Certainly, if such a statement has any meaning. But even granting this,
far from concluding that the philosophy of the Declaration is accessible, we must
rather be inclined to doubt that it could have had a philosophy, even if it cannot
be ruled out on the other hand that common understandings were imbued to a
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Nevertheless, although the search for a single original mean-
ing of the constitutional right to property would be fruitless both
as a practical and as a theoretical matter, it is nonetheless enlight-
ening to explore the views of leading participants in the great
transatlantic eighteenth-century debate in all their diversity, ambi-
guity, and self-contradiction. An examination of the debates over
the constitutional right to property in the United States and
France may lead to a greater appreciation of the common and dis-
tinctive features of each national tradition. Both the American and
French revolutionaries regarded the right to property as funda-
mental to republican institutions.'88 But the formulation of that
right was rather more practical and concrete in the U.S. Bill of
Rights, and more abstract and aspirational in the French Declara-
tion. In the United States, there was perhaps a wider consensus re-
garding the nature of the right to property, which ultimately con-
tributed to the emergence of a relatively stable constitutional
order, while in France, more divergent views emerged, which re-
flected the greater social polarization of French society, and which
contained the seeds of a continuing process of revolutionary de-
velopment that persisted long into the next century. A central (if
often unexpressed) concern in the American debate was the issue
of slavery; in France, the issue of representation proved much
more important and contentious.
A. America
For the past half-century, historians and legal scholars have
presented the founding of the United States in terms of two oppos-
ing ideological traditions: Lockean liberalism and civic republican-
ism.' Writing in 1955, Louis Hartz viewed the entire history of the
United States as characterized by a unique embrace of the
Lockean values (even though they were rarely explicitly recog-
nized as such) of political pluralism and individualism.' 9 As elabo-
rated by economic libertarians such as Richard Epstein, the fun-
damental Lockean principle of the inviolability of property
greater extent by certain currents of thought than by others.
Id. at 335.
188. RIALS, supra note 5, at 157, 250.
189. See Louis HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA 50-64 (2d ed. 1991).
190. Id. at 128-29; see also GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY:
COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1776-1970, at 128-
29 (1997).
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prohibits any redistributive activity by the state and almost any
regulation that affects property values without compensation: "All
regulations, all taxes, and all modifications of liability rules are
takings of private property prima facie compensable by the
state. ' ' .9' This approach "yields a Takings Clause of cosmic propor-
tions,"1 " which, as Epstein cheerfully admits, would invalidate
"much of the twentieth-century legislation......
Since the 1960s, however, a historiographical reappraisal has
occurred that sharply questions Hartz's exclusive focus on
Lockean liberalism. The seminal studies of Bernard Bailyn,
Gordon Wood, and J.A.G. Pocock have emphasized very different
ideological currents in American revolutionary thought which may
be grouped broadly under the rubric of "civic republicanism. ""
Whereas Lockean liberalism exalted individualism and pluralism,
the civic republican tradition celebrated virtue, which is defined as
the willingness to sacrifice one's selfish private interests for the
greater public good. Civic republicans tended to regard property
as a social right, which they treated as the foundation of civic
status rather than as a mere commodity. Later, as egalitarian ideals
began to supplant hierarchical ones, republicans stressed the po-
tential for regulation and redefinition of property relations to
promote wider political participation.
Gregory Alexander has forcefully argued that the dialectical
relationship between these two conceptions of property, which he
terms "commodity" and "propriety," has been central to American
legal history from its founding to the present time.19' As he points
out, these opposing conceptions rarely existed in a pure form, but
were often both embraced by the same person to differing extents:
"Few, if any, American legal writers were consistently and exclu-
191. RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 95 (1985).
192. DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 50 (2002).
193. EPSTEIN, supra note 191, at 281.
194. See generally BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967); GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969); J.A.G. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT:
FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION, at
vii-x, 409 (1975). For an overview of work of these historians and their influence on con-
temporary legal scholarship, see LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL
LIBERALISM 143-63 (1996).
195. ALEXANDER, supra note 190, at 1 (citing CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND
PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP
(1994)).
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sively committed to one or the other.' 9. None of the Framers ex-
plicitly identified themselves solely with liberalism or with civic re-
publicanism. Nevertheless, their statements on the subject of
property tend to place Hamilton and Madison in the former camp,
and Franklin and Jefferson (at least in his early years) in the latter
camp. The tension between nature and convention was central to
the Framers' discourse on the constitutional right to property.
1. Jefferson and the Civic Republican Tradition
The civic republican view that property is created by society
and may be regulated in the public interest reflected both actual
practice and political theory during the colonial and revolutionary
periods. Governmental regulation of property was pervasive dur-
ing this time,'97 and the ideology of civic republicanism, especially
in conjunction with emerging democratic ideals, reinforced the
view that the state enjoys broad power to regulate and reorder
property relations. Scholars such as William Treanor have empha-
sized just how pervasive these ideas were during the colonial and
revolutionary periods.'98 For example, Benjamin Franklin wrote
that "Private Property... is a Creature of Society, and is subject to
the Calls of that Society, whenever its Necessities shall require it,
even to its last Farthing."'99 Thomas Paine expressed a Rous-
seauian faith stating that a government where the people are truly
sovereign could never violate basic rights, including the right to
property: "All property is safe under their protection.,'
20 0
Jefferson's views on property rights were complex and not en-
tirely consistent.20' Over the course of his life, he appeared to vacil-
196. Id. at 3; cf. William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings
Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 823 (1995) [hereinafter Treanor,
Original Understanding] (observing that "much recent historical work has contended that,
at the time of the framing, relatively few, if any, politicians of note were purely liberal or
purely republican.").
197. See generally William J. Novak, Common Regulation: Legal Origins of State
Power in America, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1061, 1070-95 (1994).
198. Treanor, Original Understanding, supra note 196, at 792-93; William Michael Tre-
anor, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 695, 698 (1985) [hereinafter Treanor, Fifth Amendment].
199. Treanor, Fifth Amendment, supra note 198, at 700 (quoting BENJAMIN
FRANKLIN, Queries and Remarks Respecting Alterations in the Constitution of Pennsyl-
vania, in 10 THE WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 54, 59 (A. Smythe ed., 1907)).
200. GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 62
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201. See generally Stanley N. Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the Right to Property in
Revolutionary America, 19 J.L. & ECON. 467 (1976).
235
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
late between rejecting and accepting Locke's theory of a natural
right to property. His statements during the revolutionary period
and during his time in France suggest that he viewed property as a
creation of positive law only, which may be subjected to limitations
in the interest of society. Jefferson's well-known decision to draft
the Declaration of Independence to substitute "the pursuit of hap-
piness" for "property" in the Lockean triad of "life, liberty, and
property" has been taken to indicate that "he did not consider
property an inalienable right. ' '2' Similarly, in reviewing Lafayette's
proposed draft of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man,
Jefferson placed the word proprit in brackets, seemingly indicat-
ing disapproval of the notion that property is a natural right. 3
Writing from Fontainebleau to Madison in 1785, Jefferson
deplored the "unequal division of property" in France and sug-
gested that the right to labor, rather than the right to property, is
fundamental:
I am conscious that an equal division of property is impractica-
ble. But the consequences of this enormous inequality produc-
ing so much misery to the bulk of mankind, legislators cannot
invent too many devices for subdividing property, only taking
care to let their subdivisions go hand in hand with the natural
affections of the human mind .... Whenever there is in any
country, uncultivated lands and unemployed poor, it is clear
that the laws of property have been so far extended as to violate
natural right. The earth is given as a common stock for man to
labour and live on. If, for the encouragement of industry we al-
low it to be appropriated, we must take care that other em-
ployment be furnished to those excluded from the appropria-
tion. If we do not the fundamental right to labour the earth
returns to the unemployed.: 4
In a famous letter sent from Paris to Madison in 1789, Jeffer-
son stressed the social character of the right to property and sug-
gested that the use of common-law devices such as entailments and
encumbrances to control property after the death of the proprietor
were void as contrary to natural law:
202. Treanor, Fifth Amendment, supra note 198, at 700.
203. Lafayette's Draft of a Declaration of Rights, in 15 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, MAR. 27, 1789-Nov. 30, 1789, at 230, 233 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958); cf.
SCHLATrER, supra note 25, at 196.
204. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Oct. 28, 1785), in 8 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, FEB. 25-Ocr. 31, 1785, at 682 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1953)
[hereinafter Letter to James Madison 1785].
[Vol. 29:201236
2007] Property as a Natural and Conventional Right 237
I set out on this ground, which I suppose to be self-evident, 'that
the earth belongs in usufruct to the living': that the dead have
neither powers nor rights over it. The portion occupied by an
individual ceases to be his when himself ceases to be, and re-
verts to the society.... [Tihe child, the legatee, or creditor takes
it, not by any natural right, but by a law of the society of which
they are members, and to which they are subject. Then no man
can, by natural right, oblige the lands he occupied, or the per-
sons who succeed him in that occupation, to the paiment of
201debts contracted by him.
As Alexander has pointed out, Jefferson emphatically re-
jected the Lockean notion that property rights are rooted in na-
ture. Rather, in Jefferson's view, property rights are conventional
and contingent in the sense that "society creates property rights
and ought continually to control them.
'2
1
Nevertheless, Jefferson did not press these radical arguments
to their ultimate conclusion. He did not advocate direct redistribu-
tive government action, much less attack the institution of private
property itself. Rather, he advocated policies that would ensure
the widest possible distribution of property without disturbing ex-
isting property rights. These "means of silently lessening the ine-
quality of property" might include the abolition of entail and pri-
mogeniture and even, as he suggested in 1785, progressive
taxation. 2"7 As a member of the Virginia legislature, he had success-
fully sponsored the former reforms (although not the latter). Many
decades later, in writing his autobiography, he continued to ex-
press great pride in these acts, which he regarded "... . as forming a
system by which every fibre would be eradicated of antient or fu-
ture aristocracy; and a foundation laid for a government truly re-
publican."'2n
205. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 15 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, MAR. 27-Nov. 30, 1789, at 392, 393 [hereinafter Letter
to James Madison 1789].
206. ALEXANDER, supra note 190, at 27.
207. Letter to James Madison 1785, supra note 204, at 682. A few years later Madison
was to echo Jefferson's enthusiasm for "silent" devices to equalize the distribution of
property without directly infringing existing rights (although Madison never went so far as
to favor progressive taxation). See JAMES MADISON, Parties, NATIONAL GAZETTE, Jan.
23, 1792, in 14 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 197 (William T. Hutchinson et al. eds.,
1962-1991).
208. THOMAS JEFFERSON, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, reprinted in THOMAS JEFFERSON:
WRITINGS 44 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984).
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Yet, despite these statements made in the 1770s and 1780s,
which apparently treated property as a conventional right, as time
passed Jefferson began to show greater sympathy for Locke's
views. As early as 1790, he praised Locke's "little book on gov-
ernment" as being "perfect as far as it goes. 2 9 As Secretary of
State under President George Washington, Jefferson kept Locke's
portrait alongside those of Newton and Bacon in his lodgings in
Philadelphia, and told his dinner guests that they were "my trinity
of the three greatest men the world had ever produced.
21
1
However, as late as 1813, Jefferson appeared to reassert the
notion that the right to property is a purely conventional, as op-
posed to a natural, right:
[I]t is a moot question whether the origin of any kind of prop-
erty is derived from nature at all ... It is agreed by those who
have seriously considered the subject, that no individual has, of
natural right, a separate property in an acre of land, for in-
stance. By an universal law, indeed, whatever, whether fixed or
movable, belongs to all men equally and in common, is the
property for the moment of him who occupies it; but when he
relinquishes the occupation, the property goes with it. Stable
ownership is the gift of social law, and is given late in the pro-
21 1gress of society.
Yet three years later, the Sage of Monticello seemed to repu-
diate these views. In 1816, in an introduction to the Lockean Trea-
tise on Political Economy by the French economist Antoine Des-
tutt de Tracy, Jefferson attacked the idea of progressive taxation,
which he had so clearly endorsed in 1785, and vigorously defended
the right of inheritance, which he had previously sharply ques-
tioned.212 Later that year he came close to embracing the Lockean
position that the right to property is natural rather than conven-
tional, declaring that "a right to property is founded in our natural
wants, in the means with which we are endowed to satisfy these
209. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Mann Randolph (May 30, 1790), in 16
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 448, Nov. 30, 1789-JULY 4, 1790, at 449 (Julian P.
Boyd ed., 1961).
210. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin Rush (Jan. 16, 1811) in THOMAS
JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra note 208, at 1234, 1236. Hamilton, who was present at that
occasion, dourly replied: "Julius Caesar was the greatest man who ever lived."
211. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in THOMAS
JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra note 208, at 1286, 1291.
212. See SCHLATTER, supra note 25, at 197.
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wants, and the right to what we acquire by those means without
violating the similar rights of other sensible beings." '213
It is difficult to reconcile the inconsistent positions that Jeffer-
son took on the subject of the right to property over the course of
his lifetime. As a revolutionary he tended to reject the Lockean
notion that the right to property is natural, pre-political and fun-
damental. However, if he regarded property as a social right po-
tentially subject to redistributive measures, he preferred that any
such measures be implemented gradually and indirectly, without
attacking existing holdings. His final words on the subject seem
decidedly at odds with his early views, perhaps reflecting a retreat
from radical egalitarianism.
2. Madison and Property as a Fundamental Right
Unlike Jefferson, Madison was unambiguous in his support
for the idea that the right to property is fundamental and must be
immune from political interference. Indeed, as Jennifer Nedelsky
has cogently argued, the problem of protecting the right to prop-
erty within the framework of a representative government was
perhaps Madison's central obsession."' Although in Madison's day
property was relatively widely distributed in the United States, he
was nevertheless convinced that over the course of time, economic
development would result in ever greater concentration of wealth
in the hands of a small minority, as in Europe, leaving the vast ma-
jority without any property at all. 1 Under such circumstances, the
propertyless majority, unless properly restrained, would be
tempted to violate the property rights of the wealthy minority. As
early as 1785 he wrote that the question of devising a system of
representation that would adequately protect property rights was:
[A] matter of great delicacy and critical Importance. To restrain
it to the landholders will in time exclude too great a proportion
of citizens; to extend it to all citizens without regard to property,
or even to all who possess a pittance may throw too much
power into hands which will either abuse it themselves or sell it
213. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to P.S. Dupont de Nemours (Apr. 24, 1816), in
THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra note 208, at 1384, 1387.
214. JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 16-66 (1990).
215. Id. at 18.
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to the rich who will abuse it.
16
In a speech in the Federal Convention in August 1787, Madi-
son elaborated on these views:
Viewing the subject in its merits alone, the freeholders of the
Country would be the safest depositories of Republican liberty.
In future times a great majority of the People will not only be
without landed, but any other sort of, property. These will ei-
ther combine under the influence of their common situation: in
which case, the rights of property & the public liberty, will not
be secure in their hands: or which is more probable, they will
become the tools of opulence & ambition, in which case there
217will be equal danger on another side.
In Federalist 10, his famous exposition of his doctrine of fac-
tion, he explained that "[T]he most common and most durable
source of faction, has been the various and unequal distribution of
property. Those who hold, and those who are without property,
have ever formed distinct interests in society..... For Madison, this
inequality and resultant conflict of interests were inevitable. In-
deed, the protection of "the diversity in the faculties of men from
which the rights of property originate" is "the first object of Gov-
ernment. ' '21 9 Because the causes of faction cannot be removed,
Madison felt the only solution was to control its effects, and the
principal remedy advocated was a system of republican rather than
democratic government. Because he believed that democratic gov-
ernment would inevitably threaten property rights, in Madison's
view democracy was the problem rather than the solution.22 °
In 1788 Madison wrote that there are "two cardinal objects of
Government, the rights of persons and the rights of property.
2 21
Prior to the drafting of the Constitution,
the two classes of rights were so little discriminated that a provi-
sion for the rights of persons was supposed to include of itself
216. Letter from James Madison to Caleb Wallace (Aug. 23, 1785), in 8 THE PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON, MAR. 10, 1784-MAR. 28, 1786, at 350, 353 (Barbara D. Ripel &
Fredrika J. Teute eds., 1973).
217. James Madison, Suffrage Qualifications for Electing the House of Representatives
(Aug. 7, 1787), in 10 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, MAY 27, 1787-MAR. 3, 1788, at
138-139 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1977).
218. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 59 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
219. Id. at 58.
220. See NEDELSKY, supra note 214, at 203-11".
221. JAMES MADISON, Observations on the "Draught of a Constitution for Virginia"
(Oct. 15, 1788), in 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 285, 287 (1977).
240 [Vol. 29:201
2007] Property as a Natural and Conventional Right 241
those of property, and it was natural to infer from the tendency
of republican laws, that these interests would be more and more
identified. Experience and investigation have however pro-
duced more correct ideas on this subject. It is now observed that
in all populous countries, the smaller part only can be interested
in preserving the rights of property."'
Democracy, therefore, could only be a recipe for disaster.
The most Lockean of all Madison's writings was his 1792 Es-
say Property.3 Here, Madison, like Locke, distinguished between
a narrow and a broad sense of the-term "property." Echoing the
absolutist language of Locke and Blackstone, Madison defined
''property" in the narrow sense of rights to physical possessions,
such as land or chattels, as "that dominion which one man claims
and exercises over the external things of this world, in exclusion of
every other individual... 4 But in the broader sense, "property" was
a metaphor for rights in general. As Madison wrote, in its "larger
and juster meaning, it embraces every thing to which a man may
attach a value and have a right; and which leaves to everyone else
the like advantage."'225 Property in this larger sense includes funda-
mental rights such as the freedom of speech and conscience as well
as liberty and personal security. "In a word, as a man is said to
have a right to his property, he may equally well be said to have a
property in his rights." '26 Like Locke, Madison argued that the
main purpose of the state is to protect property, in both the narrow
and broad senses of the word: "Government is instituted to protect
property of every sort," both in possessions and in rights gener-
ally.2 As examples of unjust government actions that infringe the
rights to property in both the narrow and broad senses, Madison
cites "arbitrary exemptions, restrictions and monopolies" as well
as "unequal," "arbitrary" or "excessive taxes..'' 28 Just as the gov-
ernment may not take property "directly for public use without in-
demnification to the owner," Madison argued that it should not
"indirectly violate their property, in their actual possessions, in the
labor that acquires their daily subsistence, and in the hallowed
222. Id.
223. JAMES MADISON, Property, NATIONAL GAZETTE (Mar. 27, 1792), in 14 THE
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remnant of the time which ought to relieve their fatigue and
soothe their cares. ,229
A subtle distinction may nonetheless be drawn between
Locke's and Madison's views on property. For Locke, the right to
property was fully rooted in natural law, even if civil society pro-
tects it as a social right in ways that seem at tension with, or even
flatly contradictory to, its origin as a natural right. At times, Madi-
son appears simply to reflect this approach, invoking, for example,
"a principle of natural law, which vests in individuals an exclusive
right to the portions of ground with which he has incorporated his
labors. 2 30 More commonly, however, Madison tends to speak of
the right to acquire property (rather than the full right of owner-
ship) as a natural right. For example, in Federalist 10 he speaks of
"the different and unequal faculties of acquiring property.'2 31 Simi-
larly, in his essay Property, he stresses the fundamental importance
of free exercise of the "means of acquiring property. ' Later in
life, he made the distinction between the natural right of acquisi-
tion and the social right to full protection explicit: "The personal
right to acquire property, which is a natural right, gives to prop-
erty, when acquired, a right to protection, as a social right. '13 Thus,
it is not clear that Madison adopted Locke's natural right theory in
toto and without reservation.
Madison's extreme solicitude for the protection of private
property reflected his anxiety over various majoritarian threats to
the institution: agrarian laws, debtor relief, paper money, and
other redistributive schemes. Not the least of his concerns was the
potential threat to the institution of slavery. Although Madison,
like Jefferson, claimed to favor the ultimate elimination of slavery,
he defended the property rights and political power of the slave-
holding elite in the name of fundamental justice and human liberty
without embarrassment."M During the debates over the Virginia
constitution in 1829, he proposed that the three-fifths solution
adopted as a basis for federal representation be imported into the
229. Id. at 267-68.
230. NEDELSKY, supra note 214, at 29 (citing Note to Aug. 7, 1787 speech, in THE
MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON
505 (Marvin Meyers ed. 1973)).
231. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 218, at 58.
232. MADISON, Property, supra note 223, at 268.
233. James Madison, Speech in the Virginia Constitutional Convention (Dec. 2, 1829),
in JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS (Jack N. Rakove ed. 1999).
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state constitution in order to protect the interests of slaveholders:
"It is apprehended, if the power of the Commonwealth shall be in
the hands of a majority, who shall have no interest in this species
of property, that, from the facility with which it may be oppressed
by excessive taxation, injustice will be done to its owners. 235
Transported by the prospect of such "oppression" to paroxysms of
sanctimony, Madison exclaimed:
It is due to justice; due to humanity; due to truth; to the sympa-
thies of our nature; in fine, to our character as a people, that
they [slaves] should be considered, as much as possible [i.e.,
only for purposes of limiting taxation and enhancing the politi-
cal power of their owners], in the light of human beings, and not
as mere property. As such, they are acted upon by our laws, and
have an interest in our laws. They may be considered as making
a part, though a degraded part, of the families to which they be-
long.
236
In this purple peroration, Madison paints the defense of slavery,
which was integral to the jusnaturalist tradition from Aristotle and
Aquinas to Locke, in garish colors of a faux humanitarianism. It
reveals the disturbing extent to which the absolutist rhetoric of
property as dominion could be deployed to justify the starkest
forms of domination.
3. Constitutional Protection of the Right to Property
The extent to which the personal property interests of the
Framers influenced the design of the Federal Constitution has
been the subject of intense scholarly debate for nearly a century.
In 1913, the work of Charles Beard2 37 shattered the prevailing con-
sensus of nineteenth-century historiography. This consensus
tended to view the Constitution as the well-nigh miraculous
handiwork of disinterested statesmen who utterly disregarded
their own personal interests in their single-minded focus on the
broader public good. Beard argued that the Constitution reflected
the general economic interests of the Framers, who were by and
large drawn from the wealthiest strata of the population, and con-
cluded that it "was essentially an economic document based on the
concept that the fundamental private rights of property are ante-
235. Id. at 825.
236. Id.
237. CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES (16th ed. 1959) (1913).
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rior to government and morally beyond the reach of popular ma-
jorities. ' 38 Moreover, he concluded that in particular the drafting
and ratification of the Constitution represented the triumph of
"personalty interests" (i.e. financial, manufacturing, and commer-
cial concerns) over small farmers and debtors. 2' Although Beard's
views initially came under sharp attack, his Progressive economic
interpretation ultimately became the dominant view in the first
half of the twentieth century.
In the 1950s, Beard's thesis came under renewed assault in
the works of Robert Brown and Forrest McDonald.2"° Brown at-
tacked Beard's views in their entirety, arguing that the Constitu-
tion democratically reflected the interests of the entire popula-
tion.2 "1 McDonald, on the other hand, specifically attacked Beard's
thesis that the Constitution represented the triumph of a consoli-
dated group of personalty interests. 2 In the second half of the
twentieth century, the view of Brown and McDonald became the
new orthodoxy, and Beard's view was widely treated as discred-
ited.
Neither the twentieth-century proponents nor the opponents
of the economic thesis, however, had undertaken a detailed and
rigorous statistical analysis of the precise economic interests of the
framers and ratifiers and their votes on specific issues. Part of the
difficulty consisted in the fact that the Framers could not be neatly
classified into dichotomous groups representing personality and
realty interests. Most of them had a variety of economic interests
that were often in conflict on specific issues. Robert McGuire has
recently undertaken a detailed statistical economic analysis that
takes into account all the economic interests and measures the par-
tial effects of each interest on the probability of voting in favor of
particular positions. 3 McGuire's study confirms Beard's broad
proposition that the specific economic interests of the framers and
ratifiers clearly influenced their positions, although it does not
238. Id. at 324.
239. See id. at 324-25.
240. See generally ROBERT E. BROWN, CHARLES BEARD AND THE CONSTITUTION: A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (1956);
FORREST MCDONALD, WE THE PEOPLE: THE ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION (rev. ed., Transaction Publishers 1992) (1958).
241. BROWN, supra note 240, at 199-200.
242. See MCDONALD, supra note 240, at 400.
243. ROBERT A. McGUIRE, TO FORM A MORE PERFECT UNION: A NEW ECONOMIC
INTERPRETATION OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (2003).
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confirm his narrow claim that they can be neatly divided into di-
chotomous groups.
Whatever the personal motivations of the Framers, it is clear
that the protection of property was their central concern at Phila-
delphia. One delegate after another proclaimed its cardinal impor-
tance. In the words of Alexander Hamilton, the "[o]ne great
obj[ect] of Gov[ernment] is personal protection and the security of
Property.""2 ' Even more emphatically, Gouverneur Morris ob-
served that "Life & liberty were generally said to be of more value,
than property. An accurate view of the matter would nevertheless
prove that property was the main object of Society. '24 5 John
Rutledge seconded that view: "The gentleman last up had spoken
some of his sentiments precisely. Property was certainly the prin-
cipal object of Society." '246 Pierce Butler stated that the "Govern-
ment . . . was instituted principally for the protection of property,
and was itself to be supported by property." '247 In almost identical
terms, Charles Pinckney stated that the government was "insti-
tuted for the protection of property. 2 48 John Dickinson urged that
restriction of suffrage to freeholders was "a necessary defense
against the dangerous influence of those multitudes without prop-
erty and without principle with which our Country like all others,
will in time abound."2 '9 From a rather different perspective, John
Mercer, who ended up opposing the Constitution and leaving the
Convention early, complained: "It is a first principle in political
science, that wherever the rights of property are secured, an aris-
tocracy will grow out of it ... The Governments of America will
become aristocracies. They are so already... The Legislature must
& will be composed of wealth & abilities, and the people will be
governed by a Junto. 25°
The primary means by which the Convention sought to pro-
tect property were structural devices, rather than formal limita-
tions on government powers. By and large, the Framers shared
Madison's lack of confidence in the latter, which he derided as
244. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 302 (Max Farrand
ed., 1911).
245. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
at 244 (Ohio Univ. Press 1966) (1787).
246. Id. at 245.
247. Id. at 268.
248. Id. at 279.
249. Id. at 402.
250. Id. at 451.
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"parchment barriers. ' ' "l The few formal limitations that were in-
cluded were aimed at forestalling the sorts of specific attacks on
property rights that were most widespread under the Articles of
Confederation, including: *issuance of depreciating paper cur-
rency 2 and debtor relief laws (prohibited by the Contracts
Clause)."s In addition, numerous provisions were inserted to pro-
tect the property interests of slaveholders and slave-traders.2 "4 The
most important structural protections for property rights were the
separation of powers, the system of checks and balances such as
the presidential veto and judicial review, bicameralism, large elec-
toral districts, indirect elections of the President and the Senate,
and the small size and lengthy staggered terms of the latter. Madi-
son also unsuccessfully advocated further measures for the protec-
tion of property, including the limitation of suffrage to freeholders,
a council of revision, and a national veto over all state legislation."'
With the decision to draw up a bill of rights, it was decided to
supplement these specific formal limitations and general structural
protections with general formal limitations on government depri-
vations of property, which became the Due Process and Takings
Clauses of the Fifth Amendment.' The Due Process Clause had
deep roots in the Anglo-American legal tradition, stretching all the
way back to the Magna Carta.7" Analogous provisions existed in
the colonial charters and the legislation and constitutions of most
251. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 332-33 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
252. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5; art. I § 10, cl. 1.
253. See id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
254. See id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (Three-Fifths Clause); art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (Importation of Per-
sons Clause); art. IV, § 2 (Fugitive Slave Clause). In addition, the Insurrections and Do-
mestic Violence Clauses were widely understood to empower the federal government to
suppress slave uprisings. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15; art. IV, § 4. Furthermore, the restrictions on
capitations and the prohibitions on export taxes were intended to prevent Congress from
creating tax incentives for emancipation. Id. art. I, § 9, cls. 4-5. The Importation and Capi-
tation Clauses were further entrenched by a prohibition on amending them for twenty
years. Id. art. V. Cf. WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760-1848, at 62-63 (1977) (stating that "the Philadel-
phia Convention inserted no less than ten clauses in the Constitution that directly or indi-
rectly accommodated the peculiar institution.").
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256. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.").
257. See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES &
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of the states , and at least four of the state ratifying conventions
demanded that such a provision be inserted into the federal Con-
stitution. 2"
The pedigree of the Takings Clause, on the other hand, is
much shorter and more obscure. It had no close general analogue
in English or colonial legislation, nor in most revolutionary state
constitutions. It may, however, be said to reflect Anglo-American
legal practice. The Pennsylvania Constitution and the Virginia
Declaration of Rights of 1776 prohibited takings without the
owner's consent or the authorization of the legislature, but con-
tained no requirement of just compensation."' Massachusetts was
the only one of the original thirteen states to require compensation
(in its constitution of 1780) prior to Congress' adoption of the fed-
eral Bill of Rights. Similar provisions are also found in the 1777
Constitution of Vermont2 6 (which was admitted as the fourteenth
state in 1790) and in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.263 As Tre-
anor has argued, the "[aldoption of these clauses evidenced a
growing rejection of traditional republican ideology, a decline of
faith in legislatures, and a new concern for individual rights-
particularly property rights. '"" Nevertheless, there was little
clamor for the adoption of a federal takings clause or compensa-
tion requirement in 1789. None of the state ratifying conventions
demanded the adoption of such a provision, as they had done in
the case of the Due Process Clause.
Instead, the inclusion of the Takings Clause in the Bill of
Rights was apparently largely the work of Madison himself. As
originally proposed on June 8 in the House. of Representatives,
Madison's version provided: "No person shall.., be obliged to re-
258. See id. at 349-56 (collecting analogous provisions from Connecticut, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont and Virginia).
259. See id. at 348-49 (reproducing proposals from the ratifying conventions in New
York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania and Virginia).
260. Id. at 373-74.
261. See id. at 373 ("[W]henever the publick exigencies require, that the property of
any individual should be appropriated to publick uses, he shall receive a reasonable com-
pensation therefor.").
262. See id. at 374 ("[W]henever any particular Man's Property is taken for the Use of
the Public, the Owner ought to receive an Equivalent in Money.").
263. See id. ("[S]hould the public exigencies make it Necessary for the common pres-
ervation to take any persons property, or to demand his particular services, full compensa-
tion shall be made for the same.").
264. Treanor, Fifth Amendment, supra note 198, at 701.
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linquish his property, where it may be necessary for public use,
without a just compensation. 26. On July 28, when it was reported
out of the committee, it had taken on the form in which it now ap-
pears in the Fifth Amendment.266 However, there is no record of
the committee's deliberations, and there was no discussion of the
provision before the full House. There is also no record of discus-
sion in the Senate or in the ratifying conventions. Given the almost
complete lack of legislative history, it is highly likely, as several
scholars have concluded, that "[t]he Takings Clause most likely
was perceived as effecting no change in the legal status quo with
respect to government takings of property., 26 7 In particular, it was
clearly understood to apply only to physical expropriation, and not
to extend to merely regulatory measures. 8 Moreover, it is likely
that the phrase "for public use" was understood merely as a de-
scriptive reference to eminent domain (thus clarifying that the
Clause did not apply, for example to taxation, fines or forfeitures),
not as a substantive limitation on the uses to which the govern-
ment could devote expropriated property.269
Remarkably, the general provisions of the Due Process and
Takings Clauses do not specifically guarantee the existence of pri-
vate property at all. Rather, they merely provide that a state that
recognizes the right to property may not deprive an individual of it
without due process or compensation. Nor does the Constitution
specify the basis of the right to property, much less declare it to be
a natural right. If the Framers were in general agreement on the
central importance of the property rights, they could not agree on
the extent to which such rights were natural and sacrosanct or con-
ventional and subject to political redefinition. Hence, they es-
chewed such difficult philosophical debates in favor of specific lim-
ited practical restraints on the expropriation of existing holdings.
B. France
During the past half-century, the study of the French Revolu-
tion has undergone a seismic historiographical shift every bit as
265. THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES &
ORIGINS, supra note 257, at 361.
266. Id. at 362.
267. DANA & MERRILL, supra note 192, at 14-15 (emphasis omitted).
268. Treanor, Original Understanding, supra note 196, at 785-97.
269. Matthew P. Harrington, "Public Use" and the Original Understanding of the So-
Called "Takings" Clause, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1245, 1248 (2002).
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profound as that which has shaken study of its American counter-
part. Until the second half of the twentieth century, the dominant
approach was that especially associated with Marxist historians but
shared as well by many others, who saw the revolution primarily in
terms of a class struggle in which the rising bourgeoisie seized
power from the declining feudal aristocracy."' More recent, 'revi-
sionist' work both in France and in the English-speaking world has
challenged this view, stressing the continuities rather than the dis-
continuities between the ancien rdgime and the post-revolutionary
order."'
Although recent scholarship has thus questioned the extent to
which the French revolution was truly a social revolution, its social
aspects were undeniably more prominent than those of its Ameri-
can counterpart. Feudalism, although moribund, was by no means
dead under Louis XVI; but by the end of the revolution, feudalism
had been destroyed as a legal institution, and in addition, vast
amounts of church property had been transferred to new owners.
In America, on the other hand, feudalism hardly existed even in
colonial times, and although the revolutionary legislatures abol-
ished slavery in the North, where it was largely marginal to begin
with, the peculiar institution survived unscathed in the South,
where it was central to the economy. In France, widespread eco-
nomic disparities and greater social polarization and unrest led to
greater political instability than in America, where property was
much more evenly distributed. Thus in France often violent politi-
cal agitation by propertyless groups played a much greater role in
shaping the course of events. This led to the emergence of a
greater range of views on the right to property, including a signifi-
cant focus on the rights of the indigent to social assistance. Gener-
ally, however, at least among the revolutionary elites, in France as
in America the sanctity of the right to property was unquestioned.
270. See, e.g., GEORGES LEFEBVRE, THE COMING OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION
(1947); ALBERT SOBOUL, COMPRENDRE LA REVOLUTION 71,90 (1981).
271. See generally FRANQOIS FURET, PENSER LA RtVOLUTION FRAN;AISE (1978);
ALFRED COBBAN, THE SOCIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (2d ed.
1999).
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1. The Declaration of 1789
a. Feudal and Revolutionary Conceptions of Property
The legislative history of the French Declaration of the Rights
of Man and the Citizen of 1789, in stark contrast to very thin re-
cord of the drafts and debates over the U.S. Bill of Rights, is over-
whelming in its variety and complexity. The most comprehensive
published collection, edited by St6phane Rials, contains several
dozen draft declarations of rights presented to the National As-
sembly; but in 1789, there were many more in circulation, whether
contained in the lists of grievances (cahiers de dolances) prepared
in advance of the meeting of the Estates-General, or in manu-
scripts prepared by delegates or other interested parties. 2 The
right to property was central to almost all of these projects, but the
participants in the debates staked out almost every conceivable
position on the subject. The partisans of the old order saw the
guarantee of property rights as a bulwark of the old order; revolu-
tionaries saw it as the centerpiece of their attack on feudalism.
Many defended the right to property in Lockean terms as a natural
right; others insisted it was purely social and conventional. The
majority spoke mainly in terms of rights, but a number demanded
a declaration of concomitant responsibilities. While most viewed
property rights as essential to the creation of a proper constitu-
tional order, some argued that issuing an express guarantee before
the constitution had even been established would be foolish and
even counterproductive.
One of the first participants to propose a guarantee of prop-
erty rights was Louis XVI himself. But His Majesty insisted that
any guarantee of the right to property must include feudal rights.27 '
Belatedly realizing the political explosiveness of his decision to
summon the Estates-General, on June 23, 1789, he called a "sgance
royale" in a vain effort to put the genie of the revolution back into
the bottle. " In a trembling voice, he admonished the Third Estate
for its "illegal" proceedings, and at the same time attempted to
mollify it by presenting a "Declaration of Intentions. ''7 Article 14
of this declaration provided: "All properties will be constantly re-
272. RIALS, supra note 5, at 15-16, 32, 37.
273. Id. at 48.
274. Id. at 48.
275. Id.
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spected, and under the term 'properties' His Majesty expressly un-
derstands tithes, dues, rents, feudal and seigniorial rights, and in
general all useful or honorific rights and prerogatives attached to
lands and fiefs or belonging to persons."
The leading lights of the Assembly, although equally attached
to the right to property, understood it in quite a different sense. In
their view, feudal rights were irrational vestiges of special privi-
lege, and fetters on the right to property properly understood. The
philosopher Condorcet, for example, published a draft declaration
of rights as -early as February 1789, before the Assembly had even
been elected. The draft declaration contained seven articles de-
voted to the security and freedom of property.2 76 Among these we
find the following: "Property may not be subjected under any pre-
text to any arbitrary or irredeemable obligation [servitude]. '7 The
Marquis de Lafayette drew up no fewer than three such draft dec-
larations, which he shared with both Madison and Jefferson. 278 Al-
though much shorter and less theoretical than Condorcet's pro-
posal, they stress the equality of rights and in particular the right to
the fruits of one's own industry, thus reflecting a Lockean outlook
that is at odds with feudal conceptions of property.
Several of the cahiers de dolances went even further, urging
the outright abolition of feudal property rights. One of them, for
example, immediately after stating that "all property is inviolable,"
proceeded to declare that "all rights that never could be property
rights, because they represent a constant violation of natural right,
shall be suppressed, as well as those which, although property
rights in principle, have necessarily ceased to be such because the
initial cause to which they were linked has ceased to exist."2 79 The
unmistakable reference is to feudal rights that were either based
purely on extortion, or on a historical guarantee of military protec-
tion that had long since fallen into abeyance.
b. Siey~s: Lockeanism and Social Solidarity
The leading intellect in the drafting of the Declaration was
the abb6 Siey~s. Although as the Revolution grew increasingly
276. Id. at 549.
277. Id.
278. See id. at 528, 567, 590.
279. PROJET DE DtCLARATION DE DROITS CONTENU DANS LE CAHIER DE
DOLEANCES DU TIERS tTAT DE LA PRIEVOTt ET VICOMTt DE PARIS HORS LES MURS
(1789), reprinted in id. at 564-66.
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radical he would later be seen as a moderate, in 1789 he was the
leader of the progressive forces in the Assembly. 20 Appointed to
serve on the committee of eight assigned to prepare an initial
draft, he presented his first proposal on June 20 in the form of an
extended theoretical discussion followed by a proposed declara-
tion in thirty-two articles.28'
Sieybs' theoretical discussion clearly reveals his debt to
Locke. In a series of logically linked propositions, he derived the
right to property from the fundamental right of autonomy basic to
any system of individual rights:
The first of rights is the property in one's person.
From this primitive right flows the right to one's actions and la-
bor; for labor is but the useful employment of one's faculties; it
is a clear emanation of property in one's person and one's ac-
tions.
Property in external objects, or property in things [la proprit
r~elle], is likewise but a consequence and an extension of prop-
erty in one's person [la proprigtg personelle].... 8
In the proposed articles that followed, Siey~s developed these
Lockean principles, beginning with the affirmation that society is
based on a social contract aimed at ensuring the good of its mem-
bers by protecting their rights to their persons and their labor, and
culminating in a series of broad guarantees for the right to prop-
erty, including free disposition, immunity from abridgement, and
equal protection. 3 But with a clear eye to the sale of public office
under the ancien rdgime, he also provides that there can be no
property right to the exercise of a public function, which can only
be considered a duty, not a right. 4
However, Siey~s departed from Locke in recognizing a duty
on the part of property-owners to provide social assistance to the
less fortunate, declaring: "Every citizen who is incapable of provid-
ing for his own needs has the right to the assistance of his fellow
citizens." '85 Antecedents of this principle can be found both in the
Christian theologians and in the civilian doctrines of necessity
280. See RIALS, supra note 5, at 36-37, 142.
281. Id. at 130-32.
282. Id. at 596.
283. Id. at 603-04 (arts. I, II, VI, VII, IX, XVII).
284. Id. at 605 (art. XXX).
285. Id. (art. XXV) ("Tout citoyen qui est dans 'irnpuissance de pourvoir A ses be-
soins, a droit aux secours de ses concitoyens.").
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elaborated by Grotius and Pufendorf. This provision was not
adopted in the final version of the 1789 declaration, but that was to
have great significance for future developments, both during the
later stages of the Revolution, throughout the nineteenth century,
and in many modern constitutions throughout the world.
Siey~s' proposal was printed and distributed to all the depu-
ties,28 but it was not adopted by the committee. On July 27, the
more moderate Mounier presented to the Assembly two new draft
proposals, one on behalf of himself, and the other on behalf of the
committee. Both these drafts287 were far less indebted to Locke and
laid much less stress on the social contract, the freedom to labor,
and the right to property. In his personal draft, Mounier did in-
clude property alongside liberty, security, honor, life, freedom of
expression, and the right to resist oppression, in a rather lengthy
list of imprescriptable rights." But apart from this cursory men-
tion, he did not develop the concept of the right to property at any
length. He was also notably silent on the right of the indigent to
public assistance. The committee's draft was clearly based on
Mounier's personal draft (although somewhat longer); it did not
elaborate on the right to property any further. 29 Champion de
Cic6, in a speech explaining the committee's work to the Assem-
bly, was careful to praise both Siey~s' and Mounier's proposals,
but intimated that the former was perhaps too difficult for the or-
dinary person to understand, and left no doubt that his sympathies
lay rather with the latter, which was much closer to Lafayette's
earlier project.9 '
At the same time, numerous other proposals were circulating
among the Assembly.29' Of these, that of Target292 was most notable
for its extended treatment of the right to property. Target's pro-
posal owed much to Siey~s and contained a whole series of articles
(XV-XIX) devoted to the protection of property rights. Of these,
article XVI contains language on expropriation that is quite close
to the language of the final version.293
286. Id. at 132.
287. Id. at 132-33.
288. Id. at 606-07 (art. IV).
289. For a discussion of this proposal, see id. at 145-46; for the text, see id. at 612-14.
290. Id. at 134-35.
291. See id. at 136, 576-90.
292. Id. at 608-12.
293. Id. at 610.
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c. Malouet: Attack on the Declaration
In the debate that ensued over these various proposals, none
of them seemed likely to garner the support of a majority. On Au-
gust 1, a number of moderate and conservative deputies took ad-
vantage of the opportunity to call into question the entire enter-
prise of drafting a declaration of rights.294 Malouet, who would
emerge as the leader of the so-called monarchien faction, did not
question the paramount importance of the rights of man as a phi-
losophical matter, and agreed that those rights should form the ba-
sis of the new legal order. But he argued that a declaration of
those rights should not be inserted into the constitution itself, as
had been done in many of the newly-independent American states.
For Malouet, the differences between the nature and the distribu-
tion of property rights in France and America were crucial:
I realize that the Americans have not taken this precaution;
they have taken man from the bosom of nature, and presented
him to the universe in his primitive sovereignty. But American
society, recently formed, is'9' composed entirely of property
owners already accustomed to equality, strangers both to luxury
and indigence, barely familiar with the yoke of taxation, of the
prejudices that dominate us, and encountering no trace of feu-
dalism on the land that they cultivate. Such men were undoubt-
edly prepared to receive the full impact of freedom: for their
tastes, manners and situation summoned them to democracy.
But we, Gentlemen, have as felloW-citizens an immense multi-
tude of men without property... who are at times irritated, not
without just cause, by the spectacle of luxury and opulence.
Surely you will not think that I conclude from this that this class
of citizens has no equal right to freedom. . .. But I think, Gen-
tlemen, that it is necessary, in a great empire, for men placed by
fate in a condition of dependency to see rather the just limits
296than the extent of natural freedom.
Thus, Malouet concluded that it would be dangerous and
cruel to dangle the rights of property before the eyes of the prop-
ertyless masses, without any concrete measures to ensure that they
might actually enjoy such rights. Furthermore, in Malouet's view,
natural rights, such as the right to property, have real meaning
294. See id. at 155-56.
295. The text in Rials' edition erroneously prints "et" [and] here, where the original
source has the homophonous word "est" [is]. 8 ARCHIVES PARLEMENTAIRES 322 (1875).
296. RIALS, supra note 5, at 157.
[Vol. 29:201
2007] Property as a Natural and Conventional Right 255
only to the extent that they are implemented-and thereby modi-
fied and limited-as positive rights. Therefore, he urged the As-
sembly to climb down from the metaphysical heights of declara-
tions of natural rights and devote itself instead to the practical
work of drafting a constitution and laws that would implement
those rights meaningfully.
2
d. Lad~bat: Property as a Social Right
Despite the reservations expressed by Malouet and other
moderates, in late July and early August the number of draft pro-
posals before the Assembly continued to multiply. These included
a second proposal by Siey~s, as well as more than a dozen others.298
Of all these proposals, perhaps the most interesting from the
standpoint of property rights was the proposal that Andre-Daniel
Laffon de Lad~bat, a moderate Protestant aristocrat from Bor-
deaux, introduced on August 13.299 In a series of logically linked ar-
ticles, Lad~bat rejected the notion that the right to property is
natural, treating it instead as a purely social right. He declared that
society should determine whether property should be held in
common or divided into private holdings, and that the former sys-
tem "can only exist in societies that are not populous," whereas
the latter is "indispensable in populous societies."3" Although he
asserted that private property was a social rather than a natural in-
stitution, he nonetheless insisted that it must be considered sacred.
Most interestingly, his proposal declared: "The most sacred form
of property is that which is acquired by work. Those [forms of
property] which are obtained by succession or by gift may be sub-
jected to more detailed regulation under the laws for the mainte-
nance of public order." 30 Thus, Lad~bat accepted the Lockean
idea that labor is central to property rights and took it one step
further, using it to construct a hierarchy of such rights, with prop-
erty acquired by labor at its summit. But at the same time, he re-
jected the Lockean idea that those rights are in any way natural or
pre-political. A final noteworthy feature of Lad~bat's proposal was
his articulation of the free alienability of property as a fundamen-
tal principle of law: "The social order requires that each person
297. Id. at 158.
298. The texts of many of these proposals are reprinted at id. 614-749.
299. Id. at 185, 307, 699.
300. Id. at 700.
301. Id.
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possessed of property should be able to dispose of it to the greatest
advantage.... Thus any condition imposed upon the transmission
or possession of property that diminishes its value and is not freely
redeemable is contrary to the social order. ' 3
e. Marat: Rousseauian Egalitarianism
Marat, who was not a member of the Assembly, also pub-
lished his own proposal in the middle of August.0 His proposal
went far beyond even Siey~s' in insisting in that society has the
duty to assist those without means. In Marat's view, the state must
take an actively redistributive role to insure a relative equality of
advantage. In a bombastic reworking of Rousseau, Marat railed
against the great fortunes which "are almost all the fruit of in-
trigues, charlatanism, privilege, peculations, provocations and pil-
lage: those who are glutted with superfluities ought to contribute
to the needs of those who lack basic necessities. '"" He, however,
did not call for absolute equality of property, which he considered
impractical, and recognized that a certain amount of inequality in
property will result from the inequality of natural abilities. Rather,
he insisted that citizens who have equal rights ought to enjoy
"more or less" the same advantages, and that the law should inter-
vene to prevent inequalities in property that do not reflect differ-
ences in ability, "by fixing limits that they may not exceed." ' 5 Nev-
ertheless, however great its reception on the streets of Paris,
Marat's radical egalitarianism went so far beyond the proposals of
the members of the Assembly, that as Rials concludes, "it is diffi-
cult to imagine that it could have had any influence at all" on
them.
f. The Abolition of Feudalism
External events did, however, have an effect on the debates in
the Assembly. All over France, mobs of hungry peasants began to
take matters into their own hands, attacking the estates of the rich,
302. Id.
303. Id. at 189-90.
304. Id. at 739 ("[C]eux qui regorgent de superflu doivent subvenir aux besoins de
ceux qui manquent du ndcessaire."). Cf 3 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, OEUVRES
COMPLtTES, supra note 168, at 194 ("[I]l est manifestement contre la Loi de Nature ...
qu'une poignde de gens regorgent de superfluit6s, tandis que la multitude affam6e manque
du n6cessaire.").
305. RIALS, supra note 5, at 739.
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seizing their property, and burning the records of feudal land ten-
ures. These developments had a double effect on the delegates in
the capital. On the one hand, it became clear that if they were not
to lose control of the situation, they would have to yield to the
facts on the ground by moving to dismantle the legal structure of
feudalism. Thus, on the night of August 4, 1789, the Assembly
voted to abolish the feudal system, and within a few days, the fi-
nancial emergency led to discussions of the expropriation of eccle-
siastical property as well."6 On the other hand, if the Assembly did
not move quickly to establish property rights on a firm basis, the
wave of expropriations threatened to engulf all private property,
including that of the bourgeoisie. During these discussions, Duport
suggested that feudal obligations should be abolished without
compensation, while Mounier insisted that they must be protected
like any other form of property. 7
Similarly, in the debate over ecclesiastical property, Siey~s in-
sisted that compensation be paid, while Lacoste and Lameth op-
posed him on this point."0 Lameth rested his argument on a dis-
tinction between natural and artificial persons. Only natural
persons enjoyed a natural right to property that was independent
of society."° Artificial persons such as ecclesiastical corporations,
on the other hand, were created by society for its benefit. Thus, so-
ciety could suppress such entities at will, and a fortiori it could
modify or expropriate them.10 Ultimately, the deputies of the First
Estate voluntarily consented to relinquish their property, and in
exchange the state agreed to undertake to provide for the mainte-
nance of the clergy, of church buildings, and of the charitable work
undertaken by the church."
g. The Final Version
These matters occupied the Assembly from August 4 to Au-
gust 12.312 On the twelfth, it was finally able to return to the debate
over the Declaration of Rights. In order to break the impasse cre-
ated by the seemingly endless multiplication of proposals, a new
306. Id. at 162, 191, 193.
307. Id. at 192.
308. Id. at 193-95.
309. Id. at 193.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 196-97.
312. Id. at 193-97.
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committee of five, whose most energetic member was Mirabeau,
was named. On the seventeenth, Mirabeau reported back to the
Assembly .with a new draft. This proposal included a guarantee of
the right "to dispose of one's property as one wishes," and a decla-
ration that any expropriation must be for public necessity and
must be compensated.3"3 But it omitted the theoretical justifications
for these provisions contained in prior proposals insofar as it did
not declare that the right to property was sacred, natural or inalie-
able. This omission was not accidental. As Mirabeau explained to
the Assembly, the committee had difficulty distinguishing between
natural and positive rights, and decided therefore to limit itself to
those principles that it considered beyond dispute. '4 In any case,
like earlier proposals, this new proposal failed to garner the sup-
port of the Assembly.
In the end, on August 19, the Assembly put the question of
which proposal to adopt as a basis for its final deliberations to a
vote. None of the proposals of the leading lights came even close
winning a majority: Mounier's received four votes, Lafayette's
forty-five and Siey~s' 245.315 The draft that was ultimately chosen,
with 605 votes, was a collective proposal, that of the Sixth Bureau
of the Assembly.16 A number of delegates were shocked by this
choice, which they considered extremely mediocre; but as Target
observed, the proposal of the Sixth Bureau was relatively short
and uncontroversial, and was thus well-suited to serve as the basis
for the final discussions.
The proposal of the Sixth Bureau was palpably more Lockean
than that of Mirabeau's committee. But this was not the rigorous
Lockeanism of Sieybs, but a rather "flaccid" Lockeanism that
probably served as the "common denominator" of a majority of
deputies."' If it downplayed the emphasis on the social contract
and the right of self-determination, it nevertheless declared that
the purpose of society is the protection of natural rights, and that
the right to property is derived from the exercise the natural rights
of freedom and self-preservation3 It thus at least implied-
313. Id. at 749 (arts. 11-12).
314. Id. at 388.
315. id. at 212.
316. Id. For purposes of discussion, the Assembly had been divided on July 1 into
thirty "bureaux" of forty members each. Id. at 119.
317. Id. at 214.
318. Id. at 621-22.
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although it did not explicitly declare-that the right to property is
itself natural and fundamental.
In the course of the following week, the entire Assembly
heavily revised the draft of the Sixth Bureau article by article, with
a number of sections completely rewritten. The result was a final
draft that was markedly clearer, more forceful, and more felicitous
in expression. The Lockean foundations underlying the Declara-
tion as a whole and the right to property in particular were more
sharply articulated. Thus on August 20, the initial articles were re-
placed by new material proposed by Mounier, leader of the mod-
erates. The final version clearly declares in Article 2 that property
is a natural right: "The aim of every political association is the
preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man.
These rights are liberty, property, security, and the resistance to
oppression...319
By August 26, the Assembly had at last come to the end of its
revision of the Sixth Bureau's draft, which it had reduced, in the
final version, to sixteen articles. But this was not quite the end of
its work. Duport took the floor and submitted an article guaran-
teeing the right to compensation for expropriation, which was to
become the last article, Article 17 of the final version of the Decla-
ration: "Property being a sacred and inviolable right, no one can
be deprived of it unless a legally established public necessity evi-
dently demands it, under the condition of a just and prior indem-
nity. 3 2' This article was adopted without modification "in spite of
agitated debates about which little is known.
32'
However, this was not quite the end. Although the Assembly
had enacted Article 17 with the word "Property" (la proprigtg) in
the singular, it appears that the president of the Assembly, Cler-
mont-Tonnerre, with the concurrence of several others in the se-
cretariat, including Talleyrand, modified this word to the plural
form (les proprit s) on the evening of the twenty-sixth.322 The pur-
pose of this change, as Marc Suel has argued, was apparently to
make clear that the provision extended to all forms of property,
319. Id. at 22 ("Le but de tout association politique est la conservation des droits
naturels et imprescriptibles de l'homme. Ces droits sont la libert6, la propridtd, la sfiret6,
et la r6sistance A l'oppression.").
320. Id. at 26 ("La propri6t6 6tant un droit inviolable et sacr6, nul ne peut en etre
priv6, que si ce n'est lorsque la n~cessit6 publique, 16galement constat6e, l'exige 6videm-
ment, et sous la condition d'une juste et pr6alable indemnit.")
321. Id. at 255.
322. Id. at 269.
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including those feudal rights that were not simply abolished, but
were instead made redeemable during the night of August 4.323 It
was this altered version that received the assent (acceptation) of
Louis XVI in October 1789.24 The singular form was only restored
when the Declaration was incorporated into the Constitution of
1791.
2. The Right to Property in the Revolutionary Constitutions
a. The Constitution of 1791
The Constitution of 1791 incorporated the Declaration of
1789, which was placed at its head. In the meantime, the Assembly
had voted for the confiscation of ecclesiastical property, severely
testing the strength of the principles they had just enshrined in the
Declaration, and reopening the debate over the basis and the lim-
its of the right to property. Some proponents of the confiscation
rather opportunistically resorted to arguments that seemed flatly
to contradict the Declaration's assertion that property is a sacred
and inviolable natural right. For example, Mirabeau urged that "all
property is 'a benefit (bien) acquired by virtue of the laws': the
state can deprive individuals and corporate bodies of their goods,
without paying them compensation." '25 Thouret, echoing Lameth's
arguments from 1789, drew a distinction between individual and
corporate property. Individuals have natural rights to property, he
argued, but corporations are creatures of the law, and what the law
creates, it can limit or destroy: "For the same reason that the sup-
pression of a corporation is not a homicide, the revocation of its
property rights is not a spoliation.""3 6 Many clerics were unim-
pressed by this reasoning. Ultimately, however, the Assembly jus-
tified the confiscation on the grounds that church property was
merely held in trust for the benefit of the people, and that the
church hierarchy, by neglecting its pastoral duties and abusing its
wealth to maintain itself in luxury had forfeited this trust. Thus the
323. Marc Suel, La d~claration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen. L'gnigme de I'article
17 sur le droit de proprietg. La grammaire et le pouvoir, 1974 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC
1295.
324. RIALS, supra note 5, at 270-71.
325. SCHLATrER, supra note 25, at 223.
326. Id.
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state was merely taking over the administration of these properties
327to ensure that they were used for their intended purposes.
The main text of the Constitution of 1791 repeated the guar-
antees of protection of property as a natural right contained in the
Declaration, but also reconfirmed the abolition of feudal privileges
and the confiscation of ecclesiastical property.328 It also introduced
another highly significant measure for the protection of property
rights by imposing property qualifications for the franchise.9
These qualifications, which took the form of a distinction between
"active" and "passive" citizens, combined with a series of indirect
electoral mechanisms, were the brainchild of Siey~s. Only active
citizens, defined as males over twenty-five years old who paid
taxes in the amount of at least the wages of three days of unskilled
labor, were qualified to vote for electors who sat in departmental
assemblies."' Those electors, who were subject to much higher
property qualifications varying by location, in turn chose delegates
to the National Assembly itself."' This system was not dissimilar to
that advocated by Madison in the United States, although he suc-
ceeded only in incorporating indirect elections for the President
and the Senate into the Constitution, and leaving it up to the states
to impose property qualifications at their discretion. While it is dif-
ficult to make direct comparisons, this system may have been more
democratic than that in some American states but less democratic
than that in others. 32
b. Robespierre and the Constitution of 1793
The Constitution of 1791, which attempted to establish a con-
stitutional monarchy, lasted less than a year before it collapsed.
The king was privately bent on subverting the new order that he
327. Id. at 225
328. 1791 CONST., pmbl. (proclaiming the abolition of the feudalism and venal and he-
reditary office), tit. I (guaranteeing the inviolability of property and compensation for ex-
propriation but confirming the (uncompensated) confiscation of church property), in LES
CONSTITUTIONS DE LA FRANCE DEPUIS 1789, at 35-36 (Jacques Godechot ed., 1979).
329. Id. tit. III, ch. 1, §§ I-IV, in LES CONSTITUTIONS DE LA FRANCE DEPUIS 1789,
supra note 328, at 40-43.
330. PALMER, supra note 6, at 523.
331. Id. at 522-28.
332. Palmer suggested that the French system excluded no more than one-fourth of
adult males as primary electors, and was perhaps less restrictive than that in Pennsylvania,
possibly the most democratic of the American states, but more restrictive than in Massa-
chusetts. See id. But Godechot suggested that it excluded about half the adult males. See
LES CONSTITUTIONS DE LA FRANCE DEPUIS 1789, supra note 328, at 31.
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had ostensibly accepted, and after a series of flirtations with for-
eign enemies and an attempted escape, in the summer of 1792 he
welcomed a series of military disasters as heralding the restoration
of his absolute power. Instead, in August a violent mob stormed
his palace, slaughtering his bodyguards. The new Legislative As-
sembly, barely ten months into its term, suspended the monarchy
and prepared to yield power to a new body, the Convention, which
was elected by universal suffrage (although in fact only about a
tenth of the electorate actually participated). The Convention de-
clared a republic, sent the king to the guillotine, and set about
drafting a new constitution.
Although more radical than their predecessors, the deputies
to the Convention were no enemies of private property. In Febru-
ary, the Girondins who dominated the government in early 1793
proposed a new constitution that sought in fact to strengthen the
right to property. Drafted largely by Condorcet, it contained for
the first time a definition of property that echoed the absolutist
definitions propounded by civil-law scholars going back to Bar-
tolus, and restated the guarantee of compensation in more em-
phatic form.33 Alarmed by the radical attacks on property by the
enrages or "madmen" in the popular associations, which they
feared would alienate the peasants from their cause, in March 1793
the Convention passed a measure imposing the death penalty on
anyone proposing an agrarian law.
Robespierre dismissed the talk of an agrarian law as a "phan-
tom concocted by scoundrels to terrify imbeciles. '334 But he ob-
jected strongly to the absolutist rhetoric of property rights con-
tained in Condorcet's proposal. Robespierre ridiculed the idea that
all property rights were sacred and absolute. The slave-trader's
property, he pointed out, was the human cargo chained in his ship;
the French king's property was his hereditary right to oppress his
twenty-five million subjects as he saw fit. "In defining liberty, the
first and most sacred of the natural rights of man, you have rightly
stated that that it was limited by the rights of others: Why then
have you not applied this principle to the right of property, which
333. 1793 CONST. ("Girondin" Constitution), PROJET DE DICLARATION DES DROITS
NATURELS, CIVILS, ET POLITIQUES DES HOMMES art. 21, in L. DUGUIT, ET AL., LES
CONSTITUTIONS DE LA FRANCE 33, 34 (Georges Berlia, ed., 7th ed. 1952).
334. MAXIMILIEN ROBESPIERRE, Sur la nouvelle Ddclaration de Droits (Apr. 24,
1793), in 9 OEUVRES DE MAXIMILIEN ROBESPIERRE 459, 459 (M. Bouloiseau, et al. eds.,
1910-1967).
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is a social institution? As if the eternal laws of nature were less in-
violable than human conventions!, 33 In place of the absolutist
definition of property suggested by Condorcet, Robespierre pro-
posed the following propositions:
Art. I. Property is the right of each citizen to enjoy and dispose
of the portion of goods that is guaranteed to him by the law.
II. The right of property is limited, like all others, by the obliga-
tion to respect the rights of others.
III. It may harm neither the security, nor the freedom, nor the
existence, nor the property of our fellows.
IV. Any possession or traffic that violates this principle is illicit
and immoral.
36
Robespierre also proposed the adoption of a system of pro-
gressive taxation."'
Ultimately, however, although the Jacobins triumphed over
the Girondins in the convention, they rejected Robespierre's pro-
posals and retained those of Condorcet largely unchanged. The
Jacobin (or more specifically, Montagnard) Constitution of June
24, 1793 (Year I), which never entered into force, retained and
even strengthened the property guarantees of 1789. " Repeating
the Bartolist formulation of Condorcet with only minor changes,
the 1793 Declaration of Rights defined property as "the right
which belongs to every citizen to enjoy and to dispose of at his
pleasure his goods, his income, and the fruit of his labor and his
skill.33 9 The prohibition on expropriation without just compensa-
tion reappeared in the new Declaration in an even more emphatic
form. '
Nevertheless, for the first time in history, the Montagnard
Constitution recognized that the right to property entails social re-
sponsibilities. It abolished slavery.4 It proclaimed a social duty to
provide for the welfare of the indigent: "Public assistance is a sa-
cred debt. Society owes maintenance to unfortunate citizens, ei-
335. Id. at 461.
336. Id.
337. See id.
338. 1793 CONST. ("Jacobin" or "Montagnard" Constitution) arts. 1-2, in DUGUIT, ET
AL., supra note 333, at 62.
339. Id. art 16.
340. In place of the language in the 1789 declaration (article 17) stating that "no one
may be deprived" of property, the 1793 text (article 19) emphasizes that "no one may be
deprived of the slightest portion of his property" (emphasis added).
341. Id. art 18.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
ther in procuring work for them or in assuring the means of exis-
tence for those who are unable to labor. '' 1 2 It recognized a social
duty to foster public education.343 These provisions represented at
least a partial vindication of the views of Robespierre and of
Sieybs before him. In terms of ultimate historical influence, the
recognition of the social aspect of property rights in the Constitu-
tion of 1793 was undoubtedly more significant than its absolutist
rhetoric.
c. The Thermidorian Constitution of 1795: Property as a Social
Right
The 1793 Constitution, which was supposed to take effect
once peace had been restored to France, remained both literally
and figuratively suspended, locked in a cedar ark dangling above
the legislative chamber, as the provisional revolutionary govern-
ment of the Convention dissolved into the Terror. After the coup
of Thermidor, the war continued, and the Girondins and former
constitutional monarchists who now dominated the government
were disinclined to implement a constitution enacted by their radi-
cal former enemies. Therefore the Thermidorians set about pre-
paring a new constitution that would stabilize the political situa-
tion and consolidate property rights, while eliminating the
egalitarianism, universal suffrage, and the social welfare guaran-
tees of its Montagnard predecessor. The Constitution of 1795
(Year III) repudiated the Rousseauian ideology of the Jacobins
and turned instead to Montesquieu for inspiration: Indeed, it was
less progressive not only than the constitution of 1793, but even
than the Constitution of 1791.' Many members of the Convention
doubted the need for a declaration of rights, fearing that it could
only become the source of democratic agitation.345 But in the end it
was decided to retain a declaration, albeit in much modified form.
Thus, the subversive first article of the 1789 Declaration, de-
claring that all men are born and remain equal in rights, was de-
leted because of fears it could lead to demands for a redistribution
of property. Even the notion of natural rights was dropped: After,
all, if property were a natural right, then perhaps everyone might
claim a share. Instead, liberty, equality, security and property were
342. Id. art. 21.
343. Id. art 22.
344. 1795 CONST., in DUGUIT, ET AL., supra note 333, at 73.
345. Id. at 95.
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declared to be social rights (droits de l'homme en socit6).146 Thus,
paradoxically, the Jacobins, who idolized Rousseau, endorsed
(over Robespierre's objection) the notion that property is a natu-
ral right, which Rousseau had harshly attacked; the Thermidori-
ans, on the other hand, who rejected Rousseau's egalitarianism,
nevertheless agreed with him that property is a conventional
right.347
Naturally, the Thermidorians deleted from the Constitution
the rights to work, to welfare assistance, and to education (al-
though not the abolition of slavery). They retained from their
Jacobin predecessors the absolutist definition of the right to prop-
erty.4'8 For the first time, they also supplemented the declaration of
rights with a declaration of duties, the last two of which reiterated
the duty to respect property rights. "9 The guarantee of compensa-
tion for expropriations was transferred from the declaration of
rights to the main text of the Constitution itself, which, at 377 arti-
cles, was far longer than its predecessors. Article 358 guaranteed
the right to compensation in exactly the same terms as the Consti-
tution of 1791.' But Articles 373 and 374 made it clear that prop-
erty confiscated from the church and 6migr6s was not to be re-
turned. 5 '
d. The Napoleonic Constitutions and the Civil Code
The Constitution of 1799 (Year VIII),"2 which ushered in the
Napoleonic regime, and the Constitutions of 1802 (Year X) 3"3 and
1804 (Year XII),"' which consolidated it, dispensed with declara-
tions of rights and detailed provisions on property. Far more im-
portant than these in guaranteeing private rights was the Civil
Code promulgated in 1804. While constitutions have come and
gone, the Code Napolgon has endured. As has often been ob-
served, the Code has for two centuries enjoyed a quasi-
346. Id. art. 1.
347. Id. Droits art 15.
348. Id. Droits art. 5.
349. Id. Devoirs arts. 8-9.
350. Id. art. 358.
351. Id. arts. 373-374.
352. 1799 CONST., in DUGUIT, ET AL., supra note 333, at 109.
353. SNATUS-CONSULTE ORGANIQUE DE LA CONSTITUTION DU 16 THERMIDOR AN
X (Aug. 4, 1802), in DUGUIT, ET AL., supra note 333, at 120.
354. StNATUS-CONSULTE ORGANIQUE DU 28 FRIMAIRE AN XII (Dec. 20, 1803), in L.
DUGUIT, ET AL., supra note 333, at 129.
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constitutional and almost sacred status in France. Arguably, at
least until the past few decades, it has been the most important
source of protections of individual rights.
Although the Code does not expressly endorse a specific the-
ory of property rights, remarks by the drafters (Treilhard, Grenier,
and especially the most eminent among them, Portalis) embraced
the Lockean theory of natural right.35 Moreover, article 544 force-
fully restated the absolutist civilian definition of property that had
been incorporated into the Constitutions of 1793 and 1795, while
article 545 reechoed previous guarantees of compensation for ex-
propriation. 356 Thus the effect of the Napoleonic codification was to
entrench the guarantee of property rights more effectively and
permanently than the ephemeral revolutionary constitutions had
done and to strengthen the perception of those rights as absolute
and grounded in natural law.
e. The Emergence of Constitutional Review
Subsequent French constitutions, including the Charters of
1814 and 1830 and the Constitutions of 1848 and 1852, reincorpo-
rated the same formulations of the right to property encountered
in the revolutionary constitutions.3 7 Although the Constitution of
the Third Republic (1875) contained no general bill of rights, the
Constitutions of the Fourth (1946) and Fifth (1958) Republics in-
corporated by reference the guarantees of property rights pro-
claimed in the Declaration of 1789. Nevertheless, for nearly two
centuries, the legislature had sole discretion to implement and en-
force these reiterated constitutional guarantees. The experience of
the ancien r~gime, under which the parlements or high courts had
asserted their power to block reformist legislation on the ground
that it violated fundamental higher law, was critical in crystallizing
hostility to any form of judicial review. ' This experience, com-
bined with a Rousseauean ideology that conceived of legislation as
the infallible embodiment of the sovereign general will, led to the
development of a stricter conception of the separation of powers
in France than in America, a conception incompatible with the no-
355. SCHLATrER, supra note 25, at 231-234.
356. C. civ. arts. 544-545 (Fr.).
357. See Jean Morange, La Dclaration et le droit de proprigtg, in 8 DROITS: REVUE
FRAN(AISE DE THEORIE JURIDIQUE 101,106-07 (1988).
358. See JOHN P. DAWSON, ORACLES OF THE LAW 362-73 (1968).
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tion of any external check on the legislature other than the people
themselves.
A few of the framers of the revolutionary constitutions, most
notably the abbd Siey~s, rejected this ideology, and proposed vari-
ous mechanisms of constitutional review. For example, in 1793,
Siey~s proposed the establishment of an elected grand jur6 with
the power to block the promulgation of legislation that violated
fundamental rights,359 and in 1795 he submitted a plan for a jury
constitutionnaire, to be periodically renewed from among outgoing
members of the legislative assembly by a process of staggered co-
optation.3 " In the constitution of 1799 Siey~s actually succeeded in
endowing the appointed Senate with the power to invalidate legis-
lation as unconstitutional on the referral of the government, al-
though the Senate never actually exercised this power, and this
same mechanism (also never used) was also formally resuscitated
by Napoleon III.36 These proposals were important antecedents to
twentieth-century developments, including both the influential
model of centralized constitutional review introduced by Hans
Kelsen into the Austrian Constitution of 1920, as well as the sys-
tem of constitutional review that emerged in France itself under
the Fifth Republic.
But when they were first introduced in the eighteenth cen-
tury, all of these proposals were overwhelmingly rejected on the
grounds that the people themselves could be trusted to protect
their fundamental rights. Judicial constitutional review of legisla-
tion was expressly prohibited by a series of statutory and legisla-
tive provisions, and an article of the Napoleonic penal code, still in
effect today, made judicial action "suspending application of one
or several laws or by deliberating on whether or not a law will be
published or applied" a criminal offense punishable by the loss of
civil rights."'
By the second half of the nineteenth century, however, the
idea of judicial review had been widely rehabilitated in French le-
gal thought. As Alec Stone has shown, by the late nineteenth and
359. ALEC STONE, THE BIRTH OF JUDICIAL POLITICS IN FRANCE: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 27 (1992).
360. PASQUALE PASQUINO, SIEYES ET L'INVENTION DE LA CONSTITUTION EN
FRANCE 12-13 (1998). Pasquino reproduces the text of Siey~s' proposal in an appendix. Id.
at 193-96.
361. See STONE, supra note 359, at 30.
362. Id. at 25, 264 n.10 (quoting C. PtN. art. 127 (Fr.)).
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early twentieth centuries, virtually every major figure in French
public law had repudiated the Rousseauian ideology in favor of
the idea of judicial review based on natural rights.363 But the ap-
pearance in 1921 of tdouard Lambert's classic study of Lochner-
ism3" stopped this movement in its tracks. Lambert pointed to the
reactionary jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court and warned
that instituting judicial review in France would result in the per-
manent imposition by judges of laissez-faire capitalism, stifling any
efforts at social and economic reform. Almost overnight, the schol-
arly consensus in favor of judicial review began to evaporate, and
political support for it collapsed.65
It was only under the Fifth Republic, in the latter part of the
twentieth century, that the concept of constitutional review was fi-
nally accepted, and a constitutional jurisprudence of property
rights began to emerge. The protagonist in this development was
the Conseil constitutionnel or Constitutional Council, which was
originally created to protect the executive branch from legislative
encroachment, but had begun by 1971 to exercise general powers
of constitutional review. These powers, however, are more con-
strained than the corresponding powers of judicial review enjoyed
by U.S. courts. The Conseil constitutionnel, which is technically not
a court, is the sole body empowered to review legislation for un-
constitutionality. It may do so only during the short period after
legislation has been enacted but before it has been promulgated.
Thus, while constitutional review in the United States is diffuse,
concrete, and a posteriori, in France it is centralized, abstract, and
a priori.
In a landmark 1982 decision, the Conseil constitutionnel af-
firmed that the right of property enunciated in the Declaration of
1789 enjoys full constitutional force (valeur constitutionnelle), and
invalidated numerous aspects of Socialist legislation seeking to na-
tionalize large industrial corporations and banks.366 The Socialist
government had sought to rely on the following provision in the
preamble of the 1946 Constitution: "Every asset, every enterprise,
whose exploitation is or has acquired the character of a national
public service or a de facto monopoly, must become the property
363. Id. at 35-39.
364. tDOUARD LAMBERT, LE GOUVERNEMENT DES JUGES ET LA LUTE CONTRE LA
LEGISLATION SOCIALE AUX ETATS-UNIS (1921).
365. See STONE, supra note 359, at 41-42.
366. CC decision no. 81-132 DC, Jan. 16, 1982, Rec. 17.
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of the collective. 3 67 Because the 1958 Constitution incorporated by
reference both the principles of the 1789 Declaration and of the
preamble of the 1946 Constitution, the Socialists argued that in
case of conflict, the latter superseded the former. Rejecting this
argument, the Conseil constitutionnel ruled that the 1789 principles
were supreme, and that those of 1946 could complement but could
never contradict them." Furthermore, it ruled that not only is the
right to property a fundamental constitutional value, so is the free-
dom of private enterprise (la libertg d'entreprendre).369
The most significant provision of the nationalization project
invalidated by this decision was the formula for compensation of
affected shareholders. The Socialists had proposed to assess com-
pensation under a multifactor formula based on the expropriated
companies' assets as well as the three-year average of share prices
and profits, in order to reduce any unfairness resulting from short-
term fluctuations in value. According to the Conseil constitution-
nel, the correct procedure was instead to assess these amounts as
of "the day of the property transfer, taking into account the influ-
ence which the prospect of nationalization might have had on the
value of their shares," or as Alec Stone has aptly put it, to hy-
pothesize "what the price of any given stock would have been...
had the Socialists not won the election.
3 7 0
The result was of this decision was to confer an enormous
windfall to the shareholders of the nationalized companies. As
Stone has pointed out, the final result of the struggle involving the
Government, the Conseil d'Etat, and the Conseil constitutionnel,
was that the affected shareholders received a fifty percent pre-
mium on the market value of their shares: "No stockholder who
has ever been bought out by a modern, industrial state, in any ma-
jor nationalization, has ever enjoyed terms as good as those in
France in 1982." '' The anticipated public benefits of the nationali-
zation project were eliminated, and it in fact was the public at
large, as well as the stockholders whose property was not national-
ized (and were thus not sheltered from the general decline in stock
values that had occurred), who were treated unfairly.
367. STONE, supra note 359, at 146.
368. See id. at 160.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 161.
371. Id. at 165; cf. Franqois Luchaire, Doctrine, n~c~ssit9, ou pogsie?, in
NATIONALISATIONS ET CONSTITUTION 65 (Louis Favoreu ed., 1982).
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At the jurisprudential level, the 1982 decision seemed to vin-
dicate Lambert's warning that the adoption of the institution of
constitutional review would result in the Lochnerian imposition of
laissez-faire capitalism as a matter of constitutional law. By elevat-
ing the extratextual right of free enterprise to the status of a fun-
damental constitutional right, the Conseil constitutionnel seemed
clearly to signal that in its view socialism was incompatible with
the French Constitution.372 It was a view very much in harmony
with those of the Lochner court, and at odds with the dissenting
position of Justice Holmes that "a Constitution is not intended to
embody a particular economic theory" such as laissez faire.
373
Nevertheless, subsequent jurisprudential developments have
not borne out fears of the rise of a new Lochnerism d la franqaise.
In fact, the 1982 decision itself rejected an absolutist conception of
property rights, emphasizing that such rights "have undergone an
evolution characterized ... by limitations required by the general
interest," and subsequent decisions have tended to affirm the so-
cial limitations of the right to property.7' Parallel developments in
the jurisprudential interpretation of the property guarantee of the
European Convention on Human Rights, which expressly reserves
"the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to
control the use of property in accordance with the general inter-
est, 3 5 has reinforced this tendency. As a result, the Conseil consti-
tutionnel has developed nothing comparable to the extensive regu-
latory takings jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court.376
IV. PROPERTY AS A NATURAL AND AS A POSITIVE RIGHT IN U.S.
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE
The U.S. Constitution never adopted an explicit theory of the
nature of the right to property, and throughout its history the Su-
preme Court's jurisprudence of property rights has reflected a pro-
found conflict between jusnaturalism and positivism. The first ma-
jor salvos in this debate emerged in the dueling opinions of
372. Louis Favoreu, Une Grande Decision, in NATIONALISATIONS ET CONSTITUTION,
supra note 371, at 19, 41-42.
373. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
374. See ANNE-FRANQOISE ZATrARA, LA DIMENSION CONSTITUTIONNELLE ET
EUROPEENNE DU DROIT DE PROPRItTE 130, 165 (2001) (quoting CC decision no. 81-132
DC, Jan. 16, 1982, Rec. 17).
375. First Protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms art. 1, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
376. See ZATrARA, supra note 374, at 477-86, 493-97.
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Justices Chase and Iredell in Calder v. Bull. 7 ' According to Justice
Chase, "general principles of law and reason forbid" the legisla-
ture from passing any act that would impair "the right of an ante-
cedent lawful private contract; or the right of private property. 3 78
Following this reasoning, natural law protects property rights
against legislative infringement even in the absence of any specific
constitutional guarantee. To maintain the contrary is "political
heresy.,179 But even Justice Chase, the antebellum Court's most
forceful champion of natural rights, was no orthodox Lockean. He
conceded that "the right of property, in its origin, could only arise
from compact express, or implied"; this right "is conferred by soci-
ety; is regulated by civil institution, and is always subject to the
rules prescribed by positive law." 8' Chase was thus much closer to
Grotius, and Pufendorf than to Locke: property rights are at the
same time both natural and conventional, and are subject to posi-
tive regulation.
In contrast, Justice Iredell rejected judicial review based
solely on the "abstract principles of natural justice": In the absence
of an express constitutional restraint, "private rights must yield to
public exigencies. ' .8 ' Because the requirements of natural law are
indeterminate, it cannot form the basis of constitutional adjudica-
tion: "The ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed stan-
dard: the ablest and the purest men have differed upon the sub-
ject."' Thus, in Iredell's view, the judiciary has no greater right to
pronounce upon the subject than the legislature.
In the property-rights jurisprudence of the Marshall Court,
the Contracts Clause took center stage. The Framers clearly re-
garded this clause as the most important specific guarantee of
property rights, inserting it, unlike the others, into the original
document of 1787. Moreover, in our federal system, property
rights are primarily a matter of state law; unlike the Due Process
and Takings Clauses, the Contract Clause specifically bound the
state governments. Under Chief Justice Marshall, by construing
land grants and corporate charters as protected contracts, the
Court gave the Clause broad scope. At the same time, by protect-
377. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798).
378. Id. at 388 (Chase, J.).
379. Id. at 389.
380. Id. at 394.
381. Id. at 400.
382. Id. at 399.
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ing land titles and corporate charters as contracts rather than spe-
cifically as property in cases like Fletcher v. Peck383 and Dartmouth
College v. Woodward,"4 the Court deftly "avoided the problem of
whether property rights rested on natural or positive law.,1
85
Although the Court compelled the states to respect the pri-
vate-law rights they had created by positive enactments, it recog-
nized their power to alter those rights prospectively. The constitu-
tional protection of the right to property thus did not prohibit the
states from defining and regulating property rights as a matter of
positive law in a way that did not infringe "vested" interests. Chief
Justice Marshall was himself rather sympathetic to the idea of bas-
ing constitutional property and contract rights on natural law, but
in Ogden v. Saunders,6 the only major constitutional decision in
which he could not muster a majority, he failed to incorporate his
jusnaturalist views into the case law.
The Ogden Court upheld a bankruptcy law that applied only
prospectively but did not affect contracts concluded prior to its en-
actment. Henry Wheaton (along with Daniel Webster) argued the
act was unconstitutional. This argument was preserved in a de-
tailed record contained in the case report prepared by Wheaton.
Relying heavily on civilian natural law authorities from Justinian
to Grotius, Burlamaqui, Vattel and Pothier, Wheaton argued that
the "obligation of contracts" arises from universal natural law, not
positive law, and that positive law is therefore powerless to impair
it."7 Chief Justice Marshall, writing for himself, Justice Story and
Justice Duvall, accepted this natural law argument. His treatment
of this issue, although it cites no specific authorities, seems to owe
as much to Locke as to the civilians.3" Property and contract rights,
according to Marshall, are prior and superior to rights created by
positive law; they "are not given by society, but brought into it."" 9
The other four justices, however, found the opposing argu-
ments advanced by Henry Clay more persuasive. In seriatim opin-
ions each of these justices rejected the view that constitutional
383. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
384. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
385. WILLIAM B. SCOTT, IN PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS: AMERICAN CONCEPTIONS OF
PROPERTY FROM THE SEVENTEENTH TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 121 (1977).
386. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
387. Id. at 222-23 (argument of Henry Wheaton); cf id. at 240-41 (argument of Daniel
Webster).
388. Id.
389. Id. at 346.
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rights to property and contract could be determined by reference
to natural rather than positive law. According to Justice Washing-
ton, "whenever they come into collision with each other," positive
law "is paramount" and natural law "is to be taken in strict subor-
dination to [it]." 39 Justice Johnson observed that "our constitution
no where speaks the language of men in the state of nature, 39. and
that "in a state of society," "the State decides how far the social
exercise of the rights [of contract] can be justly asserted." '392 Be-
cause the Constitution expressly empowers the government to
regulate bankruptcies, Justice Thompson noted, it can hardly be
argued that that the exercise of such a power was "a violation of
the eternal and unalterable principles of justice" embodied in
natural law.393 And Justice Trimble, while admitting that property
and contract rights originate in natural law, nevertheless insisted
that, upon entering civil society, people "necessarily surrender the
regulation and control of these natural rights and obligations into
the hands of the government" and those rights are thus "subject to
be regulated, modified, and, sometimes, absolutely restrained, by
the positive enactions of municipal law."39
The Taney Court further extended the limitations on protec-
tion of property rights under the Contracts Clause.9 The ultimate
result of these antebellum developments was that property rights
were constitutionally protected as positive rights under the con-
tracts or charters that created them, but not as natural rights exist-
ing independent of those contracts or charters. In effect, the Court
recognized the right of democratic governments to define those
rights prospectively as they saw fit, provided that they did not
trench upon vested interests created by prior enactments. The
Court rejected the arguments of Marshall and Story that would
have protected a much broader range of interests, which they re-
garded as vested as a matter of fundamental law and thus immune
even from prospective alteration. By the latter part of the nine-
teenth century, the Contracts Clause had been eclipsed as an effec-
tive bulwark of property rights. States were able to limit its reach
390. Id. at 259 (Washington, J.).
391. Id. at 290 (Johnson, J.).
392. Id. at 282.
393. Id. at 312 (Thompson, J.).
394. Id. at 319-20 (Trimble, J.).
395. See, e.g., Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837) (de-
clining to construe a corporation's privileges as exclusive).
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substantially by inserting reservation clauses into charters and con-
tracts, and the Supreme Court contributed to its demise by con-
struing contracts and charters strictly and by recognizing that they
are subject to police power regulation."
The Due Process and Takings Clauses of the Fifth Amend-
ment initially played only a minor role in the constitutional protec-
tion of property rights. Most regulation of property was a matter
of state law, and in Barron v. Baltimore.7 the Supreme Court con-
firmed that the Bill of Rights, and the Fifth Amendment in par-
ticular, did not apply to the states. 98 In the absence of an applica-
ble federal constitutional provision, the state courts fell back on
the state constitutions for the protection of property rights. But in
the early nineteenth century, many state constitutions also con-
tained no provision guaranteeing compensation for expropriation.
As we have seen, Massachusetts was the only of the original thir-
teen states to have such a provision, and although most of the sub-
sequently admitted states likewise included one in their new con-
stitutions, the original states were slow to follow suit. By the
outbreak of the Civil War six of them (including all of the original
Southern states) still had not done so."
Nonetheless, the lack of explicit constitutional provisions was
not an impediment to the development of a state constitutional ju-
risprudence of property rights. Lacking an explicit basis for consti-
tutional protection of property rights either in their own written
constitutions or in the common law tradition, state courts drew
upon the natural rights theories of civil law theorists such as
Grotius and Pufendorf. It was thus the state courts interpreting
state constitutions, rather than the federal courts, that took the
lead in the antebellum era in developing a constitutional jurispru-
dence of property as a natural right.
The leading decision was Gardner v. Trustees of the Village of
Newburgh,"' in which the New York Chancery Court invalidated a
396. See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 93, 115-16 (2d ed. 1998).
397. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
398. Id. at 250-51.
399. J.A.C. Grant, The "Higher Law" Background of Eminent Domain, 6 Wis. L. REV.
67, 70 (1931).
400. See id. at 70 nn.15-17. Of the original states, the following adopted compensation
provisions before the Civil War: Pennsylvania (1790); Connecticut (1818); New York
(1821); Rhode Island (1842); and New Jersey (1848).
401. 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. Ch. 1816).
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state statute providing that water might be taken from a certain
spring on private land for public purposes. Chancellor Kent had no
difficulty in striking down the statute despite the fact that New
York at this time had no constitutional bill of rights whatsoever,
let alone an express provision requiring compensation for expro-
priation. He was satisfied to cite Grotius, Pufendorf, and Bynker-
shoek for the proposition that "natural equity" required compen-
sation. '
Similar decisions issued from most other state courts, likewise
relying largely on the civilian natural law authorities. Indeed, a
number of courts went out of their way to insist that their decisions
on this point rested on natural justice, and any express constitu-
tional protection of property was thus superfluous."3 Some of these
decisions adhered to the position of Grotius that eminent domain
rests on an implied reservation by the state accompanying the
original grant; others preferred the view of Pufendorf that it is an
inherent attribute of sovereignty. " Alongside these civilian justifi-
cations for eminent domain, antebellum state courts also imported
the civilian jusnaturalist doctrine of public use. But these courts
transformed that doctrine, which in the civilian sources was in es-
sence merely a hortatory constraint, into a mandatory unwritten
constitutional limitation. As Matthew Harrington has shown, after
the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, these arguments were
subsequently'utilized by the federal courts to transform the "public
use" provision of the federal Takings Clause from a descriptive
provision, indicating simply that the Clause applies to exercises of
eminent domain (but not, for example, fines or forfeitures), into a
proscriptive restriction limiting the eminent domain power itself.
Unfortunately, as Harrington has pointed out, these attempts to
transform a hortatory admonition into an enforceable constitu-
tional limitation foundered in the absence of a "coherent basis for
distinguishing between 'public' and 'private' uses" and thus only
"left confusion in their wake."'" At the same time, these courts
tended to emphasize the absolute rights rhetoric of civilian jusna-
turalist doctrine, while stripping it of its strong component of social
obligation.
402. Id. at 166.
403. See, e.g., Young v. McKenzie, 3 Ga. 31, 44 (1847); Henry v. Dubuque, 10 Iowa
540, 543-44 (1860); see generally Grant, supra note 399.
404. See Harrington, supra note 269, at 1250 n.15 (citing cases).
405. Id. at 1257.
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The passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 radically
altered federal constitutional property jurisprudence. The Four-
teenth Amendment by its express terms prohibited the states from
depriving any person of property without due process of law.4 °6
Late nineteenth- and early twentieth century courts seized upon
this due process provision, now expressly applicable to the states,
to construct a jurisprudence of heightened protection of property
rights. The history of substantive due process in the Lochner era,
during which the Court struck down a host of Progressive enact-
ments aimed at ensuring public health and safety and improving
working conditions by measures establishing minimum wages,"'
maximum hours, 8 restrictions on child labor4" and so forth, is well
known. At least in its most notorious decisions, the Lochner Court
elevated the principle of laissez-faire capitalism, and the volun-
taristic and individualistic assumptions underlying late nineteenth-
century common law, to the status of immutable laws of nature.
Calvin Coolidge well reflected the spirit of his age when he gran-
diosely declared that the right to property was secured not merely
by positive law, but was "founded upon the constitution of the uni-
verse."410
The activism of the Lochner Court, as evidenced by its expan-
sive view of property rights at the expense of legislative reform ef-
forts, undermined respect for the institution of constitutional judi-
cial review both within the United States and throughout the
world. Ultimately, this activism provoked a serious constitutional
crisis that imperiled the authority of the judiciary and elicited
threats from President Roosevelt to pack the Supreme Court. In
1937, the Court abruptly backed down with its decision in West
Coast Hotel v. Parrish,411 which sustained a minimum wage law
similar to those it had struck down in earlier decisions. Parrish was
the death knell of substantive due process protection of property
rights. The following year, the Court announced a new and radi-
cally different approach in United States v. Carolene Products
Company.412 Thenceforth it applied a much more deferential stan-
406. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
407. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
408. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 45 (1905).
409. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture, 259 U.S.
20 (1922).
410. CALVIN COOLIDGE, HAVE FAITH IN MASSACHUSETIS 6 (2d ed. 1919).
411. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
412. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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dard ("rational basis" review) in reviewing legislation that in-
fringed property rights, and reserved stricter scrutiny for measures
that infringed personal liberties. That basic approach survives to
this day.
In the wake of this constitutional revolution, the Court turned
for the constitutional protection of property rights from the dis-
credited doctrine of economic substantive due process to the Tak-
ings Clause. During the Gilded Age and the Lochner era the doc-
trine of substantive due process was often said to encompass the
principle that private property may not be taken for public use
without justification. This idea rested on the then-dominant con-
ception of property as a natural right, rather than on any formal
notion of incorporation. But once the Court discredited due proc-
ess as a basis for activist judicial protection of property rights,
courts began to recast critical due process precedents as Takings
Clause decisions. The Supreme Court's decision in Chica o, Bur-
lington and Quincy Railroad Company v. City of Chicago is now
widely regarded as the first application of the doctrine of incorpo-
ration. Courts cite to this case for the now-settled proposition that
the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the protections of the
414
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment against the states. But
as recent scholarship has demonstrated, that decision rested essen-
tially on the due process clause; the notion that it incorporated the
takings clause is a gloss put on it by subsequent case law.
4 15
Another Lochner-era substantive due process decision, Penn-
sylvania Coal Company v. Mahon,41 which after the triumph of the
New Deal lay moldering for decades in the jurisprudential dustbin,
was likewise later exhumed and tarted up as a takings case."' So ef-
fective was this makeover that today the case is hardly associated
with substantive due process at all, and is widely hailed as the
foundation of modern regulatory takings jurisprudence. Only the
posthumous prestige of its author Oliver Wendell Holmes can ac-
count for this remarkable transformation. As Robert Brauneis has
pointed out, many Lochner-era decisions foreshadowed the regu-
413. 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
414. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 428 U.S. 104, 122 (1978).
415. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, The Police Power Revisited: Phantom Incorporation
and the Roots of the Takings "Muddle", 90 MINN. L. REV. 826 (2006).
416. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
417. Robert Brauneis, "The Foundation of Our 'Regulatory Takings' Jurisprudence":
The Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes's Opinions in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
106 YALE L.J. 613, 615-16 (1996).
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latory takings doctrine, but were unserviceable because of their as-
sociation with the discredited ideology of laissez-faire constitu-
tionalism. "Mahon was not similarly tainted, however, because
Justice Holmes had been canonized by the Progressives. 41 8 Thus
Holmes' imprimatur provided the "regulatory takings" doctrine
with an appropriate Progressive pedigree that enabled it to survive
the demise of Lochnerism.
Holmes, of course, was a committed positivist who ardently
defended "the right of a majority to embody their opinions in
law. 419 "The jurists who believe in natural law," he once wrote,
"seem to me to be in that naive state of mind that accepts what has
been familiar and accepted by them and their neighbors as some-
thing that must be accepted by all men everywhere. 2. In Mahon
itself, as Brauneis has shown, Holmes rejected the natural law ap-
proach that dominated Lochner-era jurisprudence, the notion of a
constitutionally protected "unchanging ideal boundary between a
property owner and the surrounding community. 42' But he also re-
jected the formalistic positivist doctrine of "vested rights," which
ultimately failed to elaborate a convincing and workable criterion
to distinguish rights that were vested from those that were not. Ul-
timately, Holmes turned to a nonformalist positivism that aban-
doned the pretensions of the vested-rights theory to establish cate-
gorical bright-line rules. In the oracular language of Mahon,
"[W]hile property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regula-
tion goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." '422 Thus positive
rather than natural law establishes the basic parameters of the
constitutional right to property. These parameters may be altered
over time by subsequent positive enactments, but any sudden dras-
tic alteration may be held unconstitutional.22
With the ascendancy of Progressive and Legal Realist atti-
tudes, the Court embraced a clearly positivistic conception of con-
stitutional property rights in a number of decisions. The locus
418. Id. at 682.
419. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). In Holmes'
view, "a Constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of
paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the state or of laissez faire." Id.
420. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Natural Law, in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
JUSTICE HOLMES: COMPLETE PUBLIC WRITINGS AND SELECTED JUDICIAL OPINIONS OF
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 446 (Sheldon M. Novik ed., 1995).
421. Brauneis, supra note 417, at 624.
422. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
423. See Brauneis, supra note 417, at 642-64.
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classicus of this approach was a due process decision, Board of Re-
gents v. Roth, where the Court proclaimed: "Property interests, of
course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are cre-
ated and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or under-
standings that stem from an independent source such as state
law. 4 24 If applied consistently to constitutional property jurispru-
dence as a whole, this approach would counsel deference to the
wishes of democratic majorities to define and regulate property
rights for the common good.425 For champions of "neutral princi-
ples" in constitutional adjudication, it has the effect of defining
property rights by reference to objective external criteria. For ad-
herents of originalism, it has the added attraction of returning due
process (at least insofar as it protects property) to its original and
arguably exclusive focus on process. For its critics, on the other
hand, this approach represents a "dramatic departure from settled
understandings" that would permit legislatures to contract or ex-
pand property rights as they see fit, leading either to "too little or
too much" protection for property rights.428
The positivist approach of Roth to constitutional property
rights has not gone unchallenged. Reflecting its ultimate origins,
modern regulatory takings jurisprudence has been "pervasively in-
fect[ed by] substantive due process concepts and principles."27 It
was perhaps inevitable, therefore, that the Lochnerian idea that
the Constitution entrenches forever the late nineteenth-century
view of property rights as absolute should reassert itself. The occa-
sion for this development was the so-called "takings revolution" of
the Rehnquist Court.
Ingeniously, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
2 '
Justice Scalia laid the groundwork for the development .of modern
regulatory takings jurisprudence by purporting to rely on the posi-
tivist approach of Roth. In Lucas, the court held that a regulation
that denies a property owner of "all economically beneficial or
424. 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
425. At least, this seems to be the most natural interpretation of the Court's reference
to "existing rules ... that stem from ... state law." But the Roth Court's language did not
completely preclude the argument that once created by state law, property rights cannot
thereafter be changed. As discussed infra, that is exactly the gloss subsequently placed on
Roth by Justice Scalia in Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council.
426. Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV.
885, 924 (2000).
427. Karkkainen, supra note 415, at 885.
428. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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productive use of his land" constitutes a per se taking requiring
compensation429 unless the regulation simply reflects "the restric-
tions that background principles of the State's law of property and
nuisance already place upon land ownership. 4 3 0 In support of this
exception, the Court cited Roth's assertion that the scope of consti-
tutionally protected property rights can only be defined by "exist-
ing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source
such as state law.4 31 But rather than holding that the state is free to
alter these "background principles" by positive enactments as it
sees fit, as this language would seem to suggest, the court strongly
suggested that by "background principles" it meant only the tradi-
tional common law power of the government to abate nuisances or
closely analogous phenomena. In order to fall within the back-
ground principles exception, the court explained,
Any limitation so severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed
(without compensation), but must inhere in the title itself ... A
law or decree with such an effect must, in other words, do no
more than duplicate the result that could have been achieved in
the courts-by adjacent landowners (or other uniquely affected
persons) under the State's law of private nuisance, or by the
State under its complementary power to abate nuisances ... or
otherwise.32
Lest we get the idea that "or otherwise" might include posi-
tive enactments that alter existing property rights in any significant
way, the Court immediately added in a footnote:
The principal 'otherwise' that we have in mind is litigation ab-
solving the State (or private parties) of liability for the destruc-
tion of 'real and personal property, in cases of actual necessity,
to prevent the spreading of a fire' or to forestall other grave
threats to the lives and property of others."
Thus, while purporting to rely on Roth's broad positivist concep-
tion of constitutional property, the Court effectively cabined this
conception within the narrow confines of the nineteenth-century
common law of nuisance. With his talismanic invocations of the
eternal sanctity of the traditional nineteenth-century common law
429. Id. at 1015 (citations omitted).
430. Id. at 1029.
431. Id. at 1030 (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
432. Id. at 1029.
433. Id. at 1029 n.16 (quoting Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16,18-19 (1880)).
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definition of property, Justice Scalia had pulled the rabbit of natu-
ral law from Roth's positivistic hat.
The potential import of Scalia's position did not go unnoticed.
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Kennedy suggested that tradi-
tional nuisance principles cannot furnish an immutable baseline
for constitutional property rights:
The common law of nuisance is too narrow a confine for the ex-
ercise of regulatory power in a complex and interdependent so-
ciety. The State should not be prevented from enacting new
regulatory initiatives in response to changing conditions... The
Takings Clause does not require a static body of state property
law.434
In a pointed dissent, Justice Blackmun echoed these concerns.
He argued that the majority's distinction between common law
nuisance rules, which the majority treated as background princi-
ples that inhere in the title to land, and legislative determinations,
and which the majority apparently did not regard as establishing
background principles, was both historically unjustified and intel-
lectually indefensible.43' Justice Blackmun was particularly scathing
about Justice Scalia's claim that his approach was rooted in his-
torical understandings of the Takings Clause. It was not entirely
clear where these 'historical' understandings came from, Justice
Blackmun quipped, "but it does not appear to be history. 4 3 6 The
hallmark of Justice Scalia's pseudo-originalism was precisely the
cavalier attitude of his approach, which "seem[ed] to treat history
as a grab bag of principles, to be adopted where they support the
Court's theory, and ignored where they do not. 4 37 Indeed, in his
opinion for the court, Justice Scalia openly conceded that "early
constitutional theorists did not believe that the Takings Clause
embraced regulations of property at all" and that his interpretation
of the Clause "is not supported by early American experience,"
but Scalia airily dismissed such concerns as "entirely irrelevant" on
the grounds that "the text of the Clause can be read to encompass
434. Id. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
435. Id. at 1052 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). As Justice Blackmun observed, Justice
Scalia purported to establish a value-neutral rule that avoided the pitfalls of determining
whether a particular land-use measure conferred a benefit or prevented a harm. However,
the nuisance exception did just that. As Blackmun noted, "[n]uisance is a French word
which means nothing more than harm." Id. at 1055 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting
William Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997 (1966)).
436. Id. at 1055-56 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
437. Id. at 1060 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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regulatory as well as physical deprivations. 4 38 As Justice Blackmun
pointed out, Justice Scalia, ignoring early case law and actual his-
torical practice, cobbled together a wholly spurious and anachro-
nistic "historical understanding" by combining nineteenth-century
common law principles with twentieth-century constitutional doc-
trine in an "attempt to package the law of two incompatible his-
torical eras and peddle it as historical fact., 439 From a substantive
point of view, the Lucas Court's approach, which confers constitu-
tional sanctity on early judicial determinations but not modem leg-
islative policies regarding what land uses are harmful, was inco-
herent."'
In Lucas, the discussion of "background principles" was es-
sentially dicta, because the challenged regulations in that case
were promulgated after the owner had taken title to the property.
But nine years later, in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,"' the Court was
faced squarely with a case in which new regulations were promul-
gated before the owner took title. The State therefore urged that
the regulations formed part of the background principles of state
law and did not trigger a compensation requirement:
Property rights are created by the State. So,... by prospective
legislation the State can shape and define property rights and
reasonable investment-backed expectations, and subsequent
owners cannot claim any injury from lost value. After all, they
purchased or took title with notice of the limitation. " '
But a bare majority on the Court, rejecting this positivist ar-
gument, proclaimed: "The State may not put so potent a Hobbe-
sian stick into the Lockean bundle.""' 3 Instead, the Court held that
promulgation of a regulation before the transfer of title was not by
itself sufficient to immunize the state from a regulatory takings
claim:
We have no occasion to consider the precise circumstances
when a legislative enactment can be deemed a background
principle of state law or whether those circumstances are pre-
438. Id. at 1028 n.15.
439. Id. at 1060 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
440. Id. at 1055 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1068-69 (Stevens, J. dissent-
ing) (majority's holding "effectively freezes the State's common law, denying the legisla-
ture much of its traditional power to revise the law governing the rights and uses of prop-
erty").
441. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
442. Id. at 626 (citation omitted).
443. Id. at 627.
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sent here. It suffices to say that a regulation that otherwise
would be unconstitutional absent compensation is not trans-
formed into a background principle of the State's law by mere
virtue of the passage of title ... A regulation or common-law
rule cannot be a background principle for some owners but not
for others ... A law does not become a background principle
for subsequent owners by enactment itself.
4"
These general statements obviously left the precise scope of
the "background principles" doctrine unresolved, and dueling con-
currences by Justices O'Connor and Scalia revealed the depth of
disagreement that remained among the majority. For Justice
O'Connor, the Court's holding did "not mean that the timing of
the regulation's enactment relative to the acquisition of title is
immaterial."4 5 In determining whether a regulatory taking has oc-
curred, reasonable investment-backed expectations remain critical,
and thus "the regulatory regime in place at the time the claimant
acquires the property" is an important factor in determining
whether a taking has occurred."6 This approach was echoed in dis-
senting opinions. 7 Justice Scalia, on the other hand, sharply dis-
agreed:
In my view, the fact that a restriction existed at the time the
purchaser took title (other than a restriction forming part of the
"background principles of the State's law of property and nui-
sance") should have no bearing upon the determination of
whether the restriction is so substantial as to constitute a tak-
448ing.
Although the Palazzolo Court rejected the pure positivist ap-
proach under which states have plenary powers to redefine prop-
erty rights, it did not clearly articulate the precise limits on such
powers. Subsequent decisions have done little to clarify the issue.
Indeed, the following year, in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council,
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, a majority of six Justices
expressed considerable sympathy for Justice O'Connor's view that
444. Id. at 629-30.
445. Id. at 633 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
446. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
447. See id. at 645 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also id. at
654-55 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
448. Id. at 637 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1029 (1992)).
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the "temporal relationship between regulatory enactment and title
acquisition" should play an important role in the takings analysis."9
Although Tahoe-Sierra did not directly involve an application
of the Lucas "background principles" doctrine, the opinion did
suggest that a majority of the Court rejected Justice Scalia's view
that early common law nuisance principles established an immuta-
ble baseline for constitutional property rights. Thus, if Lucas and
Palazzolo indicate that the Court is unwilling to embrace a pure
positivist approach under which the states are completely free to
alter property rights without paying compensation, Tahoe-Sierra
suggests that they nevertheless retain considerable latitude to re-
define or limit such rights; with the passage of time, such redefini-
tions and limitations may themselves form part of the background
principles against which constitutional claims must be evaluated.
Thus, the Court's most recent pronouncements on regulatory tak-
ings suggest a turn back from a natural toward a conventional view
of property rights. 5'
A similar result is apparent in the Court's most recent pro-
nouncement on the doctrine of public use, Kelo v. City of New
London.5' Despite the widespread outcry over the result in this
case, the Court's decision to uphold the use of eminent domain in
the transfer of land from one group of private owners to another
within the context of a comprehensive economic development plan
did not represent a radical departure from prior precedent."2 Mod-
ern Supreme Court decisions have repeatedly interpreted the
phrase "public use" to refer broadly to public utility rather than di-
rect public access; it is sufficient that the taken property be em-
ployed in a way that is of use to the public, but it need not neces-
sarily be in use by the public.453 The "public utility" interpretation
is also closer than the "public access" interpretation to the original
449. 535 U.S. 302, 335 (2002) (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island 533 U.S. 606, 636
(2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
450. Cf. Laura S. Underkuffler, Tahoe's Requiem: The Death of the Scalian View of
Property and Justice, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 727, 753 (2004) (arguing that the Tahoe deci-
sively rejected the "mythical" view that property rights are "concrete, pre-political, [and]
self-defining," and strongly recognized the importance of the public interest).
451. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
452. *See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Six Myths about Kelo, PROB. & PROP., Jan.-Feb.
2006, at 19, 19-20.
453. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33-35 (1954) (upholding condemnation of
a department store that was not itself blighted to make way for private urban renewal pro-
ject); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239-43 (1984) (upholding condemna-
tion of large landholdings in order to reduce oligopolistic concentrations of ownership).
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understanding of "public use," which arguably did not impose any
substantive limitation on the government's power to expropriate at
all 4
The four dissenting Justices in Kelo, on the other hand, relied
heavily on a natural law conception of property as an absolute
right to support their cumulative view that "public use" must be
interpreted to mean "use by the public." More than two hundred
years after Calder v. Bull, the old debate between Justices Chase
and Iredell over whether property is a natural or a positive right is
still very much alive. Both Justice O'Connor's dissent (joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas) as well as
Justice Thomas' separate dissent invoked Justice Chase's argu-
ment that redistributive action by the government violates natural
law.45 Ultimately, however, the dissenting Justices failed to articu-
late a workable alternative standard for public use and to distin-
guish prior precedents in a convincing manner.
Justice O'Connor proposed a three part test, under which a
taking is for "public use" if (1) it transfers the property to public
ownership, (2) it makes the property available for use by the pub-
lic, or (3) it is necessary to eliminate the infliction of "affirmative
harm on society.""45 But this test utterly failed to distinguish those
uses that Justice O'Connor regarded as public from those she con-
sidered private. For example, she could not explain why in her
view a stadium satisfied prong (2), but a hotel or a shopping mall
did not.457 Moreover, as Justice O'Connor herself conceded, prongs
(1) and (2) were "too constricting and impractical" to provide a
useful standard or to account for a long line of settled takings
454. See generally Harrington, supra note 269.
455. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 494 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S.
(3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798)); see also id. at 510-11 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Calder, 3
U.S. (3 Dal].) at 388). The majority opinion also quoted Justice Chase. Id. at 478 n.5 (quot-
ing Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 388). In addition, the majority opinion quoted Justice Ire-
dell. Id. at 487 n.19 (quoting Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 400 (Iredell, J., concurring)).
456. Id. at 497-500 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
457. Compare id. at 498 (stadium is public use) with id. at 503 (hotels and shopping
malls not public use). As the majority observed, the attempt to develop "use by the pub-
lic" as a workable standard proved unworkable in the nineteenth century because of just
such problems. See id. at 479-80; see also id. at 479 n.7 (quoting Dayton Gold & Silver
Mining Co. v. Seawell, 11 Nev. 394, 410 (1876) ("A hotel is used by the public as much as a
railroad.")).
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cases.4 " In an effort to accommodate such precedents, Justice
O'Connor introduced prong (3). But the third prong similarly
failed to distinguish the case at bar from prior precedents uphold-
ing takings for similar purposes. 459 Like her predecessors from the
early nineteenth century forward, Justice O'Connor failed to fash-
ion a workable judicial standard from the amorphous civilian natu-
ral-law concept of "public use."
Strangely, although Justice Thomas joined Justice O'Connor's
dissent, he clearly did not agree with it. Although he accepted
O'Connor's prongs (1) and (2), he emphatically rejected prong (3).
In his separate dissent he wrote that the Public Use Clause "allows
the government to take property only if the government owns, or
the public has the right to use, the property. , 460 He thus pointedly
ignored the "affirmative harm" prong that Justice O'Connor con-
cocted in her unconvincing effort to rescue prior precedents. For
Justice Thomas, those precedents, and indeed almost every public
use decision since at least 1896, were simply wrongly decided.461 In
his view, the Court should simply ignore these decisions and rec-
ognize that "the Public Use Clause, in short, embodied the Fram-
ers' understanding that property is a natural, fudndamental right.
462
Justice Thomas reaches his conclusion that the Constitution
embodies his preferred theory of natural rights only by disregard-
ing the amply documented conflicts of opinion in the eighteenth
century over whether property is a natural right, and if so, in what
sense. He completely ignores early practice and case law, which
provide the clearest insight into the way the Takings Clause was
likely understood, because they utterly undermine his preferred
interpretation. Instead, he turns to more indeterminate sources
such as dictionaries and treatises, which he distorts and oversimpli-
fies in order to torture the desired result from the text. 4 63 Al-
458. Id. at 498-99 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In particular, they could not account for
Berman nor (embarrassingly for Justice O'Connor) Midkiff, which she herself had au-
thored.
459. After all, if the non-blighted department store at issue in Berman could be charac-
terized as "harmful," then so could the private property at issue in Kelo. Neither was
harmful in itself; each could be characterized as harmful only insofar as it stood in the way
of an urban renewal project.
460. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 508 (Thomas, J. dissenting).
461. Id. at 515-20 (Thomas, J. dissenting).
462. Id. at 510-11 (Thomas, J. dissenting) (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386,
388 (1798)).
463. Justice Thomas relies heavily on Eric Claeys, Public Use Limitations and Natural
Property Rights, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 877 (2004). See, e.g., Kelo, 545 U.S. at 511-13
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though Samuel Johnson's dictionary of 1773 indicates that that
"use" had essentially the same broad range of meanings in 1773 as
it does today, he concludes that it could not have a broader mean-
ing in the Takings Clause because it arguably had a narrow mean-
ing in Article I of the 1787 Constitution." He simply ignores
abundant evidence to the contrary from contemporary practice.
For final confirmation, Justice Thomas turns to Blackstone.
According to Blackstone, the law does not permit the government
to take private property without the owner's consent "even for the
general good of the whole community. '65 Ergo, the Framers re-
jected the concept of government expropriation to secure a public
benefit. But, in the passage Thomas quotes, the example Black-
stone cites is the taking of property to build a public road. As
Thomas construes the passage, it would prohibit all takings of pri-
vate property, even those for "use by the public," which Thomas
argues are permitted. Moreover, Blackstone's statement, taken lit-
erally and out of context, is clearly false as a description of the ac-
tual practice in both England and America at the time. Blackstone
clearly did not intend his statement to be taken literally, for in the
very same paragraph, he hastens to add, "In this and similar cases
the legislature alone can, and indeed frequently does interpose,
and compel the individual to acquiesce."' When read within its
original context, then, Blackstone says nothing about the purposes
for which the government may take property, and certainly does
not support Justice Thomas' theory of public use.
Our modern jurisprudence of the constitutional right to prop-
erty retains little of the richness of the early debates that formed
its original matrix. It is increasingly characterized by a prolifera-
tion of inconsistent yet partially overlapping balancing tests and
categorical rules, arid and seemingly pointless distinctions between
expropriations and exactions, and unresolved questions about con-
ceptual severance in the context of partial and temporary takings.
What is conspicuously lacking is a deep consideration of the pur-
poses that property rights serve, and especially of the social dimen-
(Thomas, J. dissenting). Claeys disparages scholarship that attempts to elucidate original
understanding through an analysis of actual practice and case law. He suggests that it is
preferable to "shift the emphasis away from colonial practice and later cases to dictionary
definitions and moral theory influential at the [time of the] founding." See Claeys, supra,
at 882.
464. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 508-09; cf. Claeys, supra note 463, at 896-97.
465. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 510 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *135).
466. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *139.
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sion of the right to property. Paradoxically, an appreciation of
richness of the debate over the constitutional right to property is
most absent from the jejune analyses of the court's "originalists."
By and large, the Justices have simply projected their own policy
preferences onto the Constitution without examining the historical
record in any detail.
V. CONCLUSION
The incoherence of our modern jurisprudence of property
rights reflects a profound lack of consensus about their basis. The
notion that the right to property is natural, pre-political, and invio-
lable has coexisted uneasily with the notion that it is conventional
and subject to social regulation and redefinition. This tension re-
flects an ancient debate that seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
theorists had not succeeded in resolving. For Grotius and Pufen-
dorf, the right to property was based on a purported social con-
tract whose actual existence they signally failed to demonstrate.
Locke sought to avoid the difficulties of their contractarian ap-
proach by grounding the right to property in the natural right to
one's person and one's labor, only to fall back on the contract the-
ory to explain the institution of property in civil society. Locke
thus ended up seeking to justify positive property rights, including
slavery, that were flatly contradictory to his initial natural-law
premises. Rousseau maintained that property is a social, not a
natural right, and is strictly subordinate to the public interest; but
paradoxically he insisted that it will never be in the public interest
to violate that right.
Thus, it is not surprising that leading figures in the revolu-
tionary debates on both sides of the Atlantic took a wide range of
positions on this question. Jefferson vacillated between the positiv-
ist and jusnaturalist approach. In France, actors at opposite ends of
the political spectrum espoused both views. Jacobins and monar-
chists alike proclaimed their attachment to the sanctity and invio-
lability of property as a natural right, yet both the radical Robespi-
erre and his reactionary Thermidorian adversaries insisted on its
purely social character.
Madison and Siey&s, both central figures in the emergence of
the modern constitutional right to property, were the most ardent
disciples of Locke among the eighteenth-century framers. Their
political projects reflected all of the unresolved tensions and in-
consistencies in Locke'S thought. On the one hand, they sought to
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establish a system of government based on the consent of the gov-
erned in order to safeguard human liberty. But, like Locke, they
saw protection of existing concentrations of property from the
depredations of the majority as the central purpose of government.
Thus, they focused their efforts on contriving devices to stymie
democracy and limit political participation, whether through filter-
ing mechanisms of representation, restrictions on the franchise
relegating the propertyless to the status of "passive citizens," or, in
Madison's case, protections for the property rights of slaveholders.
Such structural mechanisms were to be the primary means of pro-
tecting the rights of property; beside them the formal guarantees
of the Fifth Amendment or of Articles 2 and 17 of the French Dec-
laration were secondary and largely hortatory.
The antidemocratic structural mechanisms championed by
Madison and Siey~s to protect propertied minorities are no longer
defensible in our modern legal culture. As a result of the hard-
fought struggles of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, modern
equality is not simply a matter of the protection of a narrow set of
private-law rights of a narrowly circumscribed class of rights-
holders, but a universal principle, extending to political and per-
haps even social rights. The central concern of the Takings Clause
of the Fifth Amendment with equal treatment of property holders
would appear to be subsumed in and largely superseded by
broader principles of equal protection enshrined in the Fourteenth
Amendment and subsequent jurisprudential developments. The
Bartolist-Blackstonian conceit that the rights of the property
owner are absolute and inviolable, which was never more than a
rhetorical trope, seems less and less apt as property rights have be-
come ever more subject to regulation, redefinition, and redistribu-
tion.
The periodic invocation of this ahistorical conceit by reac-
tionary activist judges to invalidate social, economic and environ-
mental legislation has proved, in the long run, not only ineffectual
but self-defeating. The Lochner Court's injudicious invocation of
substantive due process to protect laissez-faire capitalism only
ended up weakening the prestige of the Court and of judicial re-
view itself both domestically and internationally, culminating in
the ignominious "switch in time" of 1937. Seemingly oblivious to
this lesson and to the warnings of Lambert, the French Conseil
constitutionnel in 1982 likewise elevated the non-textual freedom
of enterprise above textual guarantees of social rights, undermin-
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ing its fragile legitimacy, only to retreat from this approach in
more recent decisions.
Similarly, the "takings revolution" of the late twentieth cen-
tury heralded by Lucas and Palazzolo purported to elevate the
nineteenth-century common law property rules to the status of
immutable constitutional principles, but more recent decisions in
the areas of both regulatory takings and public use suggest that a
majority on the Court have little appetite for a full-fledged reha-
bilitation of a constitutional property jurisprudence rooted in natu-
ral law. Those who would seek to erect a jurisprudence of constitu-
tional property rights on a neo-Lockean theory of natural right
have never really overcome the failure of that theory to justify the
existing distribution of property. Nor do they seem prepared to
draw any lessons from the way that their theory, ostensibly based
on an ideology of human rights and self-government, has been de-
ployed by its most ardent champions to justify the denial of those
rights. They ignore entirely the insights of a competing vision of
property as a conventional right created by society to serve the
public good, and therefore subject to regulation and redefinition in
order to maximize both the autonomy and well-being of all of its
members.
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